India must develop own maritime security to protect digital lifelines

Submarine cables are the silent lifelines of the digital age, carrying 99 per cent of global internet traffic and driving economic and societal growth. Following their own Moore’s Law, cable capacity doubles every 2–2.5 years, with 70,000 to 100,000 km added annually and $10 billion in investments. As of 2024, over 550 systems span 1.4 million km — enough to circle the Earth 35 times. With India’s exploding data needs, its undersea cable network is poised for exponential growth. Driven by private players, the industry has grown rapidly but in a haphazard manner, with extremely vulnerable dense clusters at chokepoints like the Luzon Strait and the Malacca Strait. A lack of formal regulation is creating serious gaps in submarine cable governance, with major strategic consequences. 

A strategic shift is redefining how nations view undersea cables — from commercial infrastructure to assets critical for sovereignty and global influence. The United States (US) has long dominated this space, but China is rapidly expanding its footprint, using its Belt and Road Initiative to control key communication routes. Pakistan, leveraging its geography, is aligning with China to gain a role in the Digital Silk Road. Rising concerns over Chinese-built cables have led to a push for “clean cable” consortia by the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan. After Chinese firms exited the South East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe 6 cable project under geopolitical pressure, they regrouped under the Europe–Middle East–Asia project. Led by China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom, with Huawei Marine Technologies as the main contractor, China is now linking Hong Kong, Hainan, Singapore, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France. 

Apart from accidental damage, sabotage is a serious threat to submarine cables, as it can be carried out relatively easily. Recently, a Chinese-owned vessel, Shunxing-39, cut undersea cables near Taiwan’s Keelung Harbor — signalling the use of cable attacks as part of Beijing’s grey-zone warfare. Adversaries have also been known to tap cables using splice chambers and optical splitters, as revealed in the Snowden leaks. The increased activity by Chinese research vessels  in the Luzon Strait, South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean — to map cables and deploy intercept devices — suggests preparation for potential strategic disruption if needed. 

China is rapidly expanding its role in laying cables, building cable ships, and developing dual-use maritime infrastructure. While Western and Japanese firms still lead in cable repair, China is boosting its capabilities, operating four to six repair vessels, with  at least one reportedly linked to the People’s Liberation Army. India, by contrast, has only one such privately-owned vessel and remains largely dependent on foreign ships. This poses a serious vulnerability, especially during crises, as it risks critical delays. India should consider expanding its cable repair capacity, potentially through a public sector shipyard. This would not only enhance national security, but also offer support to regional partners wary of Chinese vessels. 

Addressing the threat of submarine cable tapping requires continuous monitoring of critical routes and the development of advanced underwater capabilities, including sensors and unmanned vessels. Over a dozen technologies are in various stages of procurement under the iDEX initiative and must be fast-tracked. 

Several countries have enacted laws to protect submarine cables within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. In the US, laws require entities to obtain formal permission to lay submarine cables, establish no-activity buffer zones, and impose penalties for violations within the EEZ and continental shelf. In contrast, Indian law grants rights over seabed resources and the establishment of installations, but allows regulation only when activities directly interfere with these rights. This is a critical gap that needs to be plugged. 

Protecting submarine cables in international waters is far more difficult due to weak enforcement and gaps in international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  allows all states to lay cables on the high seas and requires them to criminalise intentional or negligent damage by their nationals or flagged vessels, and to cooperate in enforcement. With enforcement left to flag states, dealing with state-backed sabotage is like handing the keys to the thief and expecting the house to be safe. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) focuses on technical standards and guidance — not regulation — for cable laying and safe zones. The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), under the ITU, provides best practices and criteria for cable protection zones. Another international advisory body under the ICPC has been set up recently, but it too remains purely advisory. 

With no international maritime police, India must develop its own means to protect submarine cables on the high seas. This includes monitoring suspect vessels — especially Chinese survey ships — using space and naval assets, and maintaining a naval presence near key Indian Ocean corridors. India should also work with private operators to design tamper-proof cables, bury them deeper, and ensure strong encryption. Close cooperation with friendly countries, including the Quad, is essential. 

To prepare for sabotage, India must build redundancies and alternative submarine cable routes. Cables should be formally designated as critical information infrastructure under the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre. The National Marine Security Coordinator in the National Security Council Secretariat could lead the creation of a National Submarine Cable Security Framework, bringing together key stakeholders from the government, Indian Navy, Coast Guard, and private cable operators. 

In today’s world, protecting submarine cables is not just about keeping the internet running — it’s about keeping the nation standing. Guarding them isn’t just good policy, it’s guarding the backbone of sovereignty and strategy in a connected world. 

The author is chairman, Union Public Service Commission, and former defence secretary. The views are personal