Time-limited, auctioned export quotas beat blanket trade restrictions

The EU-China export deal to protect European carmakers is a compromise but preferable to a prohibitive tariff

chinese cars, chinese car manufacturing, cars, automobile manufacturing
Chinese electric and hybrid cars amid EU-China trade restrictions (Representative Image)(Image Credit: Bloomberg)
Shang-Jin Wei
5 min read Last Updated : Nov 19 2026 | 10:05 PM IST
The European Union and China have reportedly agreed to limit Chinese hybrid-car exports to Europe. According to Bloomberg, the deal would cap exports at about 350,000 vehicles a year, with the cap rising by 6 per cent annually. The restriction would take the form of a voluntary export restraint (VER) by China. Who wins and who loses from such an arrangement, and should VERs serve as a template for future agreements on how to manage trade conflicts? 
To answer this question, we have to go back to 1981. Under American pressure, Japan agreed to limit its car exports to the United States to 1.7 million a year. The cap was called “voluntary” so the US could maintain the façade of adherence to free trade. With exports capped, Japanese carmakers raised prices, moved upmarket, and invested the resulting profits. American consumers paid $1,500-$2,500 more per car, yet the restriction remained in place until 1994. 
Europe is no stranger to these kinds of arrangements. In 1991, the European Community and Japan reached the so-called “Elements of Consensus” agreement, which called for a 9.4 per cent reduction in Japanese car exports to Europe. The current EU-China deal is thus a return to a familiar trade instrument. 
Because VERs are protectionism by another name, the World Trade Organization banned them under the 1995 Safeguards Agreement and required existing restraints to be phased out. But the WTO’s rules have since been weakened, not least by American officials’ blatant disregard for them. For Europe, the pressing question now is whether the quota makes economic sense, not whether it complies with WTO rules. 
With Chinese carmakers rapidly gaining market share, EU policymakers are under pressure to protect one of Europe’s biggest manufacturing industries and employers. The EU’s 2024 duties applied only to battery electric vehicles. Because its investigation did not cover hybrids, those remained subject to the standard 10 per cent tariff, and Chinese hybrid exports have since surged. A quota would enable the EU to show it is protecting domestic automakers without launching a new investigation.
For China, a quota has a distinct advantage over tariffs. While tariff revenue goes to European treasuries, a quota on Chinese exports allows Chinese producers to capture the increase in export prices. Both tariffs and quotas, however, reduce the volume of Chinese exports. 
Whether a quota is a good idea is contingent on what would happen without it. If the alternative is a US-style 100 per cent tariff on Chinese cars, then a quota is clearly preferable for both sides. European consumers would still have access to some Chinese cars, and Chinese firms could continue exporting to Europe rather than lose the market entirely. 
There is, however, a better alternative for the EU: A moderate tariff on Chinese hybrids and battery EVs, with the revenue used to subsidise car production in Europe. This would allow European consumers to continue buying low-cost, high-quality Chinese cars while helping domestic automakers make the transition to EVs, without adding to the EU’s fiscal burden. 
How China allocates export licences will determine the size of its net loss from the deal. One option is to award licences based on political or business connections. In a 2013 paper, Amit Khandelwal, Peter Schott, and I examined the quotas imposed on Chinese textile and clothing exports by the US, the EU, and other importing economies until 2005. We found that licences did not go to the most productive exporters. When the quotas were abolished, exports surged and prices fell as new firms entered the market. We also found that the way export quotas were administered essentially doubled the welfare loss to China. 
Another option is to issue export licences based on firms’ historical market shares, as Japan did in the 1980s and 1990s. This may create fewer opportunities for rent-seeking, but it still favours incumbents over potentially more efficient entrants. 
The third and most effective approach is to auction the licences. China’s auto industry is caught in a fierce price war, with more than 100 brands and widespread overcapacity. An auction system would encourage industry consolidation by squeezing out less efficient manufacturers while quota rents would boost government revenue. 
The car-export deal may well reduce China’s bilateral surplus with the EU, but it will do little to shrink its overall surplus, which exceeded $1 trillion in 2025 and reflects weak domestic consumption and high savings. Cars that Europe doesn’t want will simply go to Southeast Asia, Latin America, West Asia, or Africa. Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and Thailand have already experienced a significant increase in Chinese imports, prompting some of them to raise tariffs. 
VERs are worse than tariffs for importers but better for exporters. Unlike tariffs, which generate revenue for importing countries, quotas let exporters pocket the resulting rents. The danger is that VERs tend to last long after they have served their purpose. The VERs imposed on Japan, for example, lasted more than a decade. 
Still, a VER is preferable to a prohibitive tariff—and even better if time-limited and allocated by auction. But that is an argument for carefully designed VERs in certain sectors, not a blank check for restricting trade.
 
The writer, a former chief economist at the Asian Development Bank, is professor of finance and economics at Columbia Business School and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. ©Project Syndicate, 2026
 
   

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Topics :European UnionChinaCar Exportsvehicles

First Published: Nov 19 2026 | 10:04 PM IST

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