 "Sharat Sabharwal")
Given the threat Pakistan poses, India’s goal should be to manage the relationship with the neighbouring country in a way that reduces volatility as much as possible, especially after the Pahalgam terror attack. With India taking a series of measures against Pakistan, including ban on imports, barring Pakistani ships from docking at Indian ports and vice versa, former diplomat Sharat Sabharwal, who was India’s deputy high commissioner (1995-99) and high commissioner to Pakistan (2009 to 2013), in an interview to Bhaswar Kumar and Archis Mohan, says that while calibrated coercion must remain part of India's approach to deal with Pakistan, it should be combined with diplomacy whenever possible. Sabharwal has witnessed the aftermath of Pakistan's nuclear tests, the Lahore peace bus initiative, the Kargil conflict, and 26/11 Mumbai attacks. He has also authored India's Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship. Edited excerpts of the interview:
How do you assess India’s five-pronged response to the Pahalgam attack?
India’s response so far has been largely symbolic, except for suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with immediate effect. Shutting down the Attari-Wagah Integrated Check Post will have little impact, as it never reached full potential since opening in 2012, and trade had already dwindled after Pakistan suspended it in 2019. Cancelling the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme affects only a select group. Similarly, reducing the size of the High Commissions is not unprecedented. In contrast, suspending the IWT is qualitatively different. This treaty is very precious to water-stressed Pakistan, the lower riparian, whose fears of water diversion—long voiced by planners and the public, including to me as high commissioner—now seem real. India has declared its intent to work towards withholding water. This creates deep anxiety. Yet without major infrastructure, the immediate practical impact will be limited, though the psychological pressure is significant. We have tried coercive measures, including the 2016 surgical strikes after Uri and the 2019 Balakot airstrike after Pulwama. India has been searching for additional steps to pressure Pakistan, and perhaps this moment called for such a move.
You were closely involved in India’s response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. What were the lessons learned?
In 2008, India built international pressure on Pakistan to investigate—which was easier since foreign nationals were among the victims. Pakistan initially denied the captured gunman was its national but, under pressure, launched an investigation. I took over as high commissioner in April 2009. In June, Pakistan handed over a 30-page dossier admitting—for the first and the only time—that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) orchestrated the attack from its soil. They arrested seven, including the LeT operations commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, and began prosecutions. This allowed de-escalation, though trials later stalled. The 2016 surgical strikes and 2019 Balakot airstrike established a bar for Indian response which, I believe, needs to be maintained. Yet, despite Balakot signalling India’s willingness to strike terror infrastructure deep inside Pakistan proper, surgical operations or airstrikes remain tactical. Such actions, let’s call them coercion, temporarily suppress terror activity and create uncertainty for planners—until the adversary recovers, adapts, and resumes its approach. Another key point is that diplomacy has been absent for some time. The relationship is managed solely through security measures, characterised by deterrence and coercion. Ideally, coercion should be a means to an end—its impact leveraged through diplomacy and dialogue to shift Pakistan towards a more reasonable stance. That stance won’t mean permanent peace, but could lower volatility to a manageable level.
How would you meld coercion and diplomacy?
Given the threat Pakistan poses and the nature of the state, deterrence and calibrated coercion must remain part of our approach—we cannot abandon them. But these should be combined with diplomacy whenever possible, rather than ruling it out entirely. While lasting peace isn’t achievable until Pakistan resolves its internal contradictions, our goal should be to manage the relationship in a way that reduces volatility as much as possible by blending coercion and diplomacy. We should also maximise pressure through our partners and explore every possible lever. Economic pressure is key— Financial Action Task Force (FATF) greylisting was an effective example. Pakistan’s financial support comes largely from China, but Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also bolstered its foreign exchange reserves and provided oil credit facilities. Persuading the West Asian countries to reconsider is worth exploring. While 80 per cent of Pakistan’s defence imports come from China, which is unlikely to relent, we should work to persuade other suppliers to halt transfers. These are the tools we can use.
India is set to object to the IMF’s expected $1.3 billion fresh loan to Pakistan and plans to caution other global lenders. What are the other non-kinetic measures that India can adopt?
Approaching the IMF is a significant move. Pakistan secured a $7 billion IMF bailout last year, which it has used to reassure other international financiers by claiming it is working with the IMF to stabilise its economy. Whether the IMF will factor in issues like supporting terrorism and cancel such assistance remains to be seen. Economic grounds also exist for the IMF to consider India’s position: Pakistan has repeatedly entered IMF programmes without completing them. Even under the current programme, reports suggest Pakistan is struggling to meet conditions. If India builds pressure, that might justify action—but I wouldn’t be too sure. India had earlier mobilised diplomatic efforts that played a role in Pakistan’s placement on the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—commonly known as the ‘Grey List’—in 2018. Although Pakistan was removed in October 2022, another non-kinetic option for India is to work towards its re-listing, which would undermine Islamabad’s ability to raise international financing.
What’s your take on India’s expected kinetic response?
Pakistan’s nuclear posturing hasn’t ruled out Indian military action. Kargil proved it. Balakot proved it. Regular retaliatory actions across the Line of Control, like targeting posts, also show this. There’s a threshold below the nuclear dimension where India retains kinetic options. It’s within this space that action will likely be taken. Pakistan has previously declared nuclear red lines, but Balakot was far below them—and we remain well beneath that threshold. I doubt there’s any intent to test it. The key point is nuclear weapons don’t eliminate India’s military options under that threshold.
