MCX penalty exposes need for statutory safeguards over exchanges
The Securities Markets Code must set clear limits and safeguards for exchanges exercising quasi-judicial powers
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Illustration: Binay Sinha
6 min read Last Updated : Nov 19 2026 | 9:50 PM IST
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On October 26, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) did something it rarely does to a market infrastructure institution (MII): It imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited (MCX). It also set aside a penalty of ₹1.5 crore imposed on a trading member. The order of the Exchange’s Member Committee (MC) was signed by X, who had ceased to be a member six months earlier. MCX admitted that X’s signature was a “bona fide error”.
The SAT did not investigate whose “bona fide error” it was or how it occurred. X may have continued to exercise quasi-judicial powers after leaving the MC, or someone else may have signed the order on his behalf. It remains unclear whether MCX has fixed responsibility for the error, how many other cases involved similar errors, and what measures it has taken to prevent their recurrence.
Three years earlier, the SAT had set aside a penalty order of MCX because the exchange had neither issued a show-cause notice nor provided a hearing. It had directed MCX to institute a procedure for penalty proceedings against members. Yet the structural deficiency persists: Exchanges exercise penal powers without the statutory safeguards that govern the exercise of comparable powers by the market regulator.
Consider the safeguards the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) must observe when imposing penalties. The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, specifies contraventions and prescribes the minimum and maximum penalties. It identifies factors that an adjudicating officer must consider, including the gain made, the loss caused, and the repetition of the default. The officer must issue notice, provide a hearing, determine contravention, and impose a penalty in accordance with the rules framed by the government. Penalties are credited to the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI), subject to parliamentary appropriation and audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General. Orders are appealable to the Tribunal.
When an exchange penalises a member for comparable conduct, few of these safeguards apply. Although the power derives from bye-laws and rules approved by Sebi, the penalty quantum, methodology, procedure, MC composition, and internal appeal mechanism are largely governed by circulars issued by Sebi or the exchange. These instruments are not laid before Parliament. There are no comparable adjudication rules, statutory floors and ceilings for penalty, or a list of factors governing the exercise of this power.
The destination of penalty proceeds raises a further question. Under the Act, penalties realised must be credited to the CFI, with unpaid amounts recoverable through recovery proceedings. Yet regulations made under the Act have enabled exchange-imposed penalties to be credited to Investor Protection Funds. The proceeds thus remain outside the CFI and the associated framework of parliamentary appropriation and CAG audit.
The arrangement also creates a potential conflict: The exchange imposing the penalty determines a sanction whose proceeds accrue to a fund it maintains. The arrangement deserves scrutiny both for its consistency with the parent statute and for the incentives it creates. It may encourage prompt recovery even while the member retains the right to challenge the order. The MCX case illustrates this concern.
The alleged contravention occurred on May 23, 2024. MCX issued the show-cause notice on August 14, 2024, heard the noticee on January 20, 2025, and passed the order on September 28, 2026, more than 28 months after the alleged contravention and over 20 months after the hearing. The market remained exposed to the alleged misconduct, while the noticee faced prolonged uncertainty. By contrast, the SAT disposed of the appeal in less than a month after the MCX order.
The 20-month gap between hearing and decision also raises questions about how the MC considered the evidence and submissions. A quasi-judicial decision requires careful consideration of the record and reasoned determination. There is an additional irony. After taking more than two years to decide the matter, the exchange directed the noticee to “take immediate corrective measures”.
The law allows 45 days to appeal an order. Yet the MC directed the penalty to be debited from the noticee’s settlement account within seven days. MCX debited it on the 15th day. The exchange displayed little urgency in deciding the case but considerable urgency in recovering the money.
The penalty itself presents an even more serious problem. MCX admitted that the applicable law prescribed a maximum penalty of ₹2 lakh for the alleged contravention. Yet it imposed ₹1.5 crore, 75 times that ceiling. It also levied goods and services tax, raising the total demand to ₹1.77 crore. A quasi-judicial penalty is not consideration for a service rendered by the regulator. The episode illustrates the risks of leaving penalty amounts, methodology and procedures outside the statutory framework governing the regulator.
Most such orders are not publicly available. Had this order been published when issued, the discrepancy concerning the signatory’s authority might have attracted public scrutiny. Disclosure would also enable stakeholders to examine consistency in penalty proceedings.
Online hearings introduce another concern: The noticee may not know whether all MC members participated or whether those signing the order heard the matter. Transparency about the Committee’s composition, participation in hearings, and authorship of orders is essential to credible quasi-judicial proceedings.
There is also an institutional problem. MC members may possess substantial market experience without expertise in securities law or training in quasi-judicial decision-making. They may not personally draft the orders they sign and, consequently, may not take individual ownership of their reasoning and findings.
MIIs occupy a position of trust. Their disciplinary powers are essential to market integrity, but they cannot be a law unto themselves. An order signed by someone who left the Committee six months earlier, a penalty 75 times the statutory ceiling, and a 20-month delay after the hearing are not mere administrative blemishes. Together, they expose the weakness of a framework that confers quasi-judicial powers without adequate statutory safeguards.
The Securities Markets Code offers an opportunity to correct this deficiency. Instead of relying on a patchwork of circulars and exchange procedures, the law should expressly confer a clearly bounded power on MIIs to impose monetary penalties. The exercise of quasi-judicial powers by MIIs should be subject to procedural and institutional safeguards comparable to those applicable to Sebi. Those who judge others are themselves bound by rules that leave little room for “bona fide” errors.
The writer is a former whole-time member of Sebi and former chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
The writer is a former whole-time member of Sebi and former chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
Topics : SEBI MCX Securities Appellate Tribunal BS Opinion
