The question now is what this implies for US policy going forward, particularly to those aspects of it — foreign affairs, technology regulation, and so on — which impact their relationship with the rest of the world, and especially India. That question, in turn, resolves into three. First, how will the incumbent President respond over the course of his remaining term to this defeat? Second, how much will his successor in the Republican Party diverge from Mr Trump’s approach? And third, do the Democrats provide a substantively different way of thinking about these problems in a way that would impact decision-making in non-American Capitals?
The President himself, it appears, has chosen to not see this defeat as a rebuke to himself personally. He has repeatedly said that he was “not on the ticket”, meaning that he believes that his party and its candidates are responsible, not his own popularity or lack thereof. This is in spite of the fact that his approval ratings are historically low.
He has also appointed Stephen Miller, a hardliner known best for his negative take on immigration from countries like India, as his new chief of staff. This suggests that, if anything, he will double down on those aspects of his “America-first” agenda. There does not seem to be an increased probability that he
will re-examine his approach to trade policy, for example, or to change his approach to artificial intelligence (AI) and how it is both essentially unregulated and designed to benefit big US-based technology companies.
How will he approach the war in Iran? After all, the decision to bomb Iran and kill its leader — starting a war that he has been so far unable to finish to his satisfaction — is largely responsible for a surge in energy prices and inflationary pressures across the world. According to his own vice-president, J D Vance, this decision bears most of the responsibility for the unprecedented drubbing that the Republicans received across the country. Mr Trump responded on Thursday by taking his vice-president off negotiations with Iran and refocusing him on domestic issues.
If Mr Vance is treated as the frontrunner to be the next leader of the Republican Party, an even more inward-looking US is probably on the cards — if one that is less committed to disruptive wars. If, instead, Secretary of State Marco Rubio emerges as the primary candidate, then the US might return to a more familiar, muscular approach to defence — but with the addition of strong export controls to manage and manipulate tech-supply chains. But then again, it might be an outsider with a somewhat more confrontational approach to Big Tech than the Silicon Valley-funded Mr Vance. Florida’s outgoing governor, Ron DeSantis, has been touring the country, asking for as much.
With the triumphant Democrats, it is far harder to sense what their shift in approach to the world might be if they recapture power. Obviously the war in Iran will end, and there may be no more such adventures. But will they maintain Mr Trump’s tendency to withdrawing from the world in terms of trade and multilateralism? Will they commit themselves to restoring alliances and to restoring deterrence over such issues as the Taiwan Strait? Will they view China as a competitor, and, if so, how will they treat countries in the Indo-Pacific, including India?
The fact is that, while Mr Trump’s first term marked a major departure from the previous decades of American leadership in the world, his Democratic successor did not completely reverse course. That administration continued the inward turn, including through the botched and immoral withdrawal from Afghanistan, and made it bipartisan. There is every chance that, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, the Democratic successor, if there is one, to Mr Trump will not change as much as we would like.
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