Umpires, not players

Governors cannot be political agents of the Centre

Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi has joined a lengthening list of his equivalents displaying scant regard for constitutional propriety. By unilaterally dismissing a member of the council of ministers, Mr Ravi has certainly set a precedent. He has since put the decision on hold on the advice of the Union home ministry. Mr Ravi has extensive gubernatorial experience, having served as governor of Nagaland and Meghalaya. He would be well aware, therefore, of his constitutional responsibilities, as well as settled legal opinion on the role and functions of a governor. Appointed by the President of India, the governor is not a member of Parliament or the Assembly. This distinction is important because it presupposes that the governor is apolitical in the discharge of constitutional functions. In addition, Article 163 states that the council of ministers will aid and advise the governor. The governor, therefore, has no discretion to dismiss a minister. This transgression is the latest in a long line of constitutional breaches. In the recent past, he delayed signing Bills, declined to read portions of an approved text in his address to the Assembly, and stated that secularism was introduced in the Preamble to the Constitution for “political reasons”.

Mr Ravi’s actions, together with his peers in Delhi, Telangana, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and Kerala, among other recent examples, have put the spotlight on the increasingly disruptive role that governors have come to play as agents of the ruling regime at the Centre, rather than exercising their constitutional role of checks and balances to the misuse of power by elected legislatures. In each case, acts of gubernatorial omission and commission — ranging from delays in signing legislative Bills, hasty invitations to the Bharatiya Janata Party to form a government, freelance tours of the state without informing the chief minister, and gratuitous criticisms of the state government — have often required intervention from courts. Most of these judgments have concluded with the courts reminding the governors of the limits of their powers as neutral umpires, not political players.

The steady erosion of the dignity of the office of the governor is not a new phenomenon. Previous administrations at the Centre, starting with Indira Gandhi’s prime ministership, have played their part in this trend. The deployment of Article 356, imposing President’s rule in a state on the advice of the governor, had once been a favoured device. The landmark nine-judge Constitution Bench in the S R Bommai case in 1994 acted as a kind of check on the arbitrary dismissal of state governments by hostile central governments. Since then, however, governors have explored other means of chipping away at state powers with impunity. Mr Ravi’s actions in directly dismissing a state minister without consulting the chief minister, for instance, provide strong grounds for his recall. But the rewards that have been conferred on some governors who had scarcely been exemplars suggest that the Centre is not inclined to alter these practices. The use of the governor’s office for political purposes only weakens India’s federal structure and must be avoided.