The spontaneity driving the ongoing farmers’ strike in Maharashtra has rendered it unusual and extraordinary. Though the farmers in the Puntamba block in western Maharashtra are not known to have a strong farmers’ organisation, their decision to not cultivate their fields this monsoon has fired the imagination of farmers in different districts across the state. The phenomenon is unique, but the method of agitation is not.
In the heydays of the Shetkari Saghatana, led by Sharad Joshi, then the country’s most articulate farmers’ organiser, an attempt was made to stop the supply of milk to cities. The move, however, turned out to be a fiasco. Candidly admitting failure, Joshi quickly withdrew the agitation. The retreat, however, didn’t damage the Shetkari Sanghatana’s strength. Instead, the organisation continued to grow by leaps and bounds.
The question before us now is: are we going to see history repeat itself? This could indeed be bad news for Maharashtra chief minister Devendra Fadnavis, who, till now, has kept a firm grip over the state’s agriculture policy discourse.
Strikes, a common tool of protest for organised workers, is a completely novel form of resistance in the farm sector, which is fundamentally unorganised. So the idea that they, as farmers, could actually go on strike has catalysed the imagination of young farmers. Given that we are inhabiting times dominated by a vibrant social media, spreading the message of protest has been quick and easy. The visuals of farmers throwing their produce on roads, be it vegetables or milk, has proven to be an effective way of conveying farmers’ anguish, releasing their accumulated rage.
Let us trace the processes that have led to the present situation. Farmers in the state have been battling two consecutive years of drought. For a state with a meagre 20% of land under irrigation, the prolonged continuation of drought was bound to lead to a calamity. But the ensuing unrest has failed to find political expression.
There are three main reasons for this drawback. First, the opposition parties – dislodged after helming the state for 15 years marked by sluggish agricultural growth and stagnating irrigation – are yet to regain their credibility. Second, the chief minister was successful in co-opting the Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana, a strong farmers’ organisation in western Maharashtra, by making one of its leaders the minister for agriculture. Third, and perhaps most important, is the chief minister’s skillful management of the political discourse on the agrarian crisis.
Earlier, during his election rallies in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had promised minimum support prices (MSP) for farm produce, ensuring 50% profit. But after coming to power, the Maharashtra chief minister succeeded in deflecting attention from the issues of MSPs and loan waivers. He succeeded in projecting his flagship programme, the Jalyukt Shiwar (water in every farm), as the most important programme, aimed at tackling the neglected subject of irrigation. The Jalyukt Shiwar involves constructing small water storage structures and reworking earlier structures so that the groundwater level can be quickly raised. The involvement of NGOs headed by films-stars like Nana Patekar and Aamir Khan added to the political appeal of this programme.
In fact, Fadnavis has picked up on the trail left by his predecessor, Prithviraj Chavan. The former chief minister had begun by attacking the dam and canal-dependent irrigation policy that has proved to be highly inefficient, besides helping the corrupt nexus between contractors and politicians. He launched the sakhali bandhare (chain of check dams) programme and tried to boost the implementation of MGNREGA for creating dug wells for small farmers. But unlike Fadnavis, Chavan was bound by the political compulsions of running a coalition government. While he failed to make the programme attractive to farmers, Fadnavis has succeeded in doing so.
But the real trigger of the crisis was the government’s reluctance to ensure price support to tur (gram) producers in the state. The crop is grown in large parts of the rain-fed region in the country. Encouraged by high prices in previous years and an increased MSP, the area under tur cultivation went up, and private investment through increased pesticide application raised the yield and productivity. But the prices crashed. Farmers were forced to sell their produce at as low as Rs 2,500 a quintal, when what the government had announced was Rs 5,050 a quintal.
In dealing with the situation, the government’s response was typically too little, too late. They did not assure the farmers that the promised price floor would be protected. The farmers, as a result, felt cheated. As part of damage control, the chief minister tried to convince farmers that his government would request the central government to raise the limit on the Shetkari Sanghatana’s quota for tur procurement.