Last week, China hosted the second international forum on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded it by underscoring his initiative as a global public good, arguing that “while the Belt and Road Initiative was launched by China, its opportunities and outcomes are shared by the world.” What was remarkable about this iteration of the forum was the humility in Xi’s remarks compared to the almost hubristic nature of the first form in 2017. Stung by the pushback Chinese projects have received in the last few years, Xi was forced to concede this year that China would introduce well-recognised rules and standards in its Belt and Road projects to ensure they are of high-standard, beneficial to people and sustainable. He made it clear that “we will make sure that corporates follow international rules and standards during construction, operation, merchandise and tender and respect laws and regulations in different countries.”
For the moment, however, it is Southeast Asia and Central Asia that are at the centre of BRI and that have embraced the project wholeheartedly. Europe too is now more prominent despite growing reservations in the major power centres of the continent. Africa, Latin America and West Asia, despite Chinese attempts are still not as prominent parts of the framework as possibly had been envisioned by Chinese initially. And South Asia is still a far cry given Indian reservations. At last week’s summit only Pakistan and Nepal were represented by their heads of governments.
While the Chinese President made a big deal about the fact that more than $64 billion worth of deals were signed during second BRI Forum last week, he was forced to contend with the fact that since BRI’s inception in 2013, the project has been dogged by controversies. Raising “concerns about opaque financing practices, poor governance and disregard for internationally accepted norms and standards” in BRI projects, the United States, despite participating in the first forum two years ago, pointedly refused to send any high-level official to this summit. The unilateral manner in which the project was conceived and conceptualised has been drawing criticism from around the world with suggestions that it is merely a strategy of trying to cement Chinese influence around the world by making nations financially dependent on Beijing by way of “debt trap diplomacy”. The normative order which Beijing is trying to push via BRI remains extremely problematic with questions about the financial and environmental sustainability of the projects becoming ever more central to the debate. States from around the world have pushed back strongly and China has been forced to recalibrate. And other major powers too have proposed their own infrastructure initiatives.
During the BRI Forum last week, the Chinese President tried his best to underscore China’s good intentions and commitment to transparency and building “high-quality, sustainable, risk-resistant, reasonably-priced, and inclusive infrastructure.” He seems to have understood that his initial top- down approach has backfired, and he wants to make amends. The question remains: How far will the rest of the world go in accommodating Chinese ambitions?
The writer is Director, Studies, at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, and Professor of International Relations at King’s College, London