Boost security cooperation with Russia

Defence purchases must always form part of the larger strategic relationships and not treated as something of a "stand-alone" as we have tended to do in the past

President Vladimir Putin of Russia has come and gone. Unlike in our annual high-level interface with the US, which are limited to 2+2 dialogues between the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries (the first one was held a month ago), those with Russia go right up to the highest level. Apart from several memoranda of understanding exchanged between the two countries at this meeting, reportedly an agreement on the purchase of five S-400 air defence systems has been concluded (this despite a perceived American threat of sanctions), which is seen as a game changer in the relationship and in our operational preparedness. There is no talk of the acquisition of four frigates for the Navy or of over 200 Kamov helicopters, both under the buy and make in India scheme. This is the perspective against which this visit needs to be seen.

Our defence cooperation with the erstwhile USSR goes back to the mid-1960s while that with the US has just a two-decade-old history, actually even less. While that with the former has not only resulted in the transfer of a wide spectrum of modern military hardware, including its licensed production in India (examples, MIG 21, Sukhoi 30 variants), that with the latter has, till now, led to only outright purchase with no benefits to India’s Make in India capabilities. There has been no transfer of technology from the US whilst, from Russia, we have examples such as the Brahmos missile and ATV (indigenous nuclear submarine) programmes that have given us strategically important know-how and capabilities. The Russians have also leased us a nuclear submarine not once but twice and another transfer might be in the offing. Our only aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, has come from that country. Indeed, almost 70 per cent of our military equipment owes itself to Russia. Leave aside this defence relationship, without this country’s political support during the 1971 War, the emergence of Bangladesh that neutralised a serious threat to our security from the east, would not have been possible. Despite this history, it is obvious to any strategic observer that the Indo-Russian cooperation has slid downwards in the same time that our relationship with the US has flowered.

Illustration by Ajay Mohanty

We do the Malabar series exercises with the US every year and the next one in 2019 will see the participation of all three services from both the countries. In the last few years, Japan has been co-opted in this annual engagement. Most recently, we have signed the COMCASA with the Pentagon (a new and possibly more advantageous agreement unlike the CISMOA that had been pending two decades, and not without reason). We have a Logistics Support Agreement that facilitates use of support facilities of either country. There are a number of other engagements that have revolved around the purchase of over $15 billion in American military hardware and more will surely follow. As can be seen, in this short span of 20 years we have progressed from a base of nearly zero to having the US as the largest supplier of military hardware in dollar terms. 

In this period, there has hardly been any purchase of similar value from the Russians. Yes, programmes already in motion such as the acquisition of Vikramaditya, some frigates and the nuclear submarine INS Chakra did come about but few new acquisitions have been negotiated to finality. We hear repeatedly of projects in the pipeline and the Russians will possibly also bid for the 100 multi-role fighter aircraft with their Su-35 and for the next-generation P-75I submarines but they are one among half a dozen prospective bids and there is no knowing how they will fare. Leave aside acquisition of platforms and equipment, the content of the joint exercises that are conducted with the Russians bear no comparison with the much more complex Malabar interfaces. In this period, the security engagement between Russia and China has increased rapidly with the latter receiving the same S-400 systems. In short, despite the rhetoric, the overall Indo-Russian interface is not what it used to be. This is worrisome.  

It is not that the enhanced relationship with the US in defence cooperation is unwarranted or not strategically important. With India’s potential adversaries being who they are, that country is a vital partner to have on our side and if the relationship must be transactional, so be it. If a US waiver from their Congress CAATSA sanctions for the S-400 deal comes as a possible quid pro quo for a future MMRCA deal, it can do us no harm. Given the developing global security environment, strong relations, in which defence cooperation has to play a key role, with both the US and Russia are critical to give India the strategic space it needs in promoting its own security interests. Just as the S-400 purchase has been taken forward, so must contracts for the frigates and helicopters as well as the AK rifles. We must also look at the new generation submarines in that light. Defence purchases must always form part of the larger strategic relationships and not treated as something “stand-alone” as we have tended to do in the past. To depend for as much as 70 per cent of our military equipment on one country is as much a negative as purchasing platforms worth $15 billion from another with no accretion to our indigenous capabilities. It is in this context that the defence cooperation with the two countries should be seen. 

We have always had a substantial Russian involvement in our civilian nuclear power projects and it is just right that some more reactors are envisaged. Similarly, it is desirable to take conventional energy cooperation such as the one in co-sharing of gas to a higher level. In sum, to give more strength to the Russian connection is clearly a prime national interest.

The author has served in the National Security Advisory Board