The US Senate's resolution, designed to facilitate the Indo-US nuclear deal, has the characteristic of allowing both sides of the debate within India to claim victory. Those in favour note that the Senate rejected several "killer" amendments, and hail what has been approved as a vital breakthrough, one that will help the nuclear deal become reality. At the same time, the critics are able to continue arguing that the Senate has placed unacceptable, one-of-a-kind restraints on India that will make the country hostage to US policies and thus limit its freedom of action with regard to further nuclear testing, stockpiling of weapons, and so on. They argue further that the Senate resolution is a distorted reflection of the spirit and contents of the deal hammered out by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush. The neutral observer would say that the vote in the Senate and the House of Representatives confirms the belief that America's law-makers don't really approve of what President Bush has gone and done on the nuclear front, but they don't want to run foul of India. They have therefore done the next best thing, which is to hem in the agreement with riders such that India is either genuinely tied down or the country rejects the deal altogether. | |
| The government in New Delhi has been cautious in its welcome, signalling two things: that the critics may have a point, and that there are several other steps to be taken, any and all of which could prove equally problematic. There are, after all, the safeguards and inspection deal that are to be worked out with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then a deal for uranium supplies negotiated with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (which includes China). In other words, there is as yet no guarantee of success; but then again, the Senate resolution does take the process a significant step forward. Final judgment is not possible on these different positions until the two resolutions passed in the House of Representatives and Senate are reconciled and a common resolution agreed upon. At that stage the government can decide whether it likes what it sees, and whether what is on offer measures up to Manmohan Singh's categorical assertion in Parliament that he would accept no deviations from the deal agreed on with the US President. On balance, it would seem that there are indeed some clauses in the Senate that would give India disquiet, and New Delhi should not hesitate to say so. The official response from India is therefore right to be lukewarm and watchful. |
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| It is possible to argue that too much is being made of the nuclear deal, and that it is time the countries moved on to other issues. Symbolic as it may have become, it does not define or reflect the broad range of issues on which the two countries are engaged. There is broadening and expanding trade, there is an ever-growing population of Indian students on most American campuses, there is cooperation on fending off the attentions of pirates in the Malacca Straits, and there is even agreement on the scheme to allow pensioners easier access to their money. To that list must be added textiles, for which there is enormous shop. |
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