Faulty logic

The solution to the export of terrorism does not lie in Kashmir, even if it is a long-running dispute that needs resolution

David Miliband, the apparently callow British foreign secretary, ruffled feathers in India recently when he linked the export of terrorism by Pakistan to the failure to resolve the Kashmir dispute. This is a connection that has been assiduously promoted by Pakistan, which has long argued that Kashmir is the “core” problem between the two countries. The problem is that the former president, Pervez Musharraf, is on record that resolving Kashmir would not end hostility between the two countries. It is easy to see why Mr Musharraf was right, and necessary therefore to puncture the current myth-making.

For a start, what does solution of the Kashmir problem mean? If the two countries agree on substantially greater autonomy for both Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, with open borders and the free movement of people and goods, and if such an arrangement were to meet with general acceptance in all parts of what was the original state of Kashmir—would that appease the jihadists who think nothing of slaughtering innocents in India every few months, or would they resist the loss of their calling card? Would they then insist that this is no solution at all, and continue with what they have been doing? Even more important, are the jihadists targeting Kashmir or do they really seek to control Pakistan itself, and of course Afghanistan? And what of their worldview, in which India, Israel and the United States are the prime enemies of Islam?

There are also the realities of power politics in Pakistan, and of geo-politics. The Pakistan army needs sustained hostility with India in order to maintain its stranglehold on power in that country, and its pre-eminent claim on resources and sundry privileges. If Kashmir does not provide the raison d’etre, something else will. There is also the Pakistan-China axis to consider, and China’s long-term goal of confining India to South Asia, for which it finds in Pakistan a handy tool. Indeed, given the mindset of the Pakistan elite, which views their country as somehow a counterpoise to (or rival of) India, despite the vastly differing sizes in terms of geography, population and the economy, it is easy to keep worrying about what the bigger neighbour will do and thereby create a phantom which has to be fought. None of this has anything to do with Kashmir.

The solution to the export of terrorism, therefore, does not lie in Kashmir, even if it is a long-running dispute that needs resolution. The solution (if indeed there is one) lies in cracking down on the exporters of terrorism, reducing the role of the jihadists in Pakistani society and taking away their legitimacy, strengthening the forces of civil society, and reducing the role and power of the army which has been the chief sponsor of the jihadists. These processes, neither easy nor short-term, will be facilitated by a greater two-way flow of goods and people across the border, more civilian contact and thus building on the foundation of mutual goodwill that exists in both countries. Unfortunately, the reality today is that Pakistan is not moving in this direction at all.