Governing uncertainty in geoengineering

Imagine 2030. Faced with a decade of record-breaking temperatures and three years of consecutive drought, China deploys sulphate particles in the stratosphere to reflect sunlight and reduce temperatures. A year later, India’s monsoons face a severe shock, resulting in significant crop losses. It is not clear if the Chinese intervention caused or influenced the monsoonal aberration. How would this issue be resolved? Would it be limited to climate negotiations? Would it warrant higher political intervention? 

At the fourth session of the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA-4) in Nairobi in March, a draft resolution “to prepare an assessment of the status of geoengineering technologies…” was withdrawn after parties failed to reach an agreement. “Deeply concerned about…potential global risks and adverse impacts…”, Switzerland and 10 other countries (from Burkina Faso to Mexico to South Korea) had proposed the resolution to assess climate geoengineering (CGE) science, actors and activities involved, expected impacts, and options for governance. Its failure illustrates that lack of global governance of CGE is deeply rooted in uncertainties, affecting technological research, political intentions, legitimacy of forums, and public trust. 

Climate geoengineering is deliberate large-scale intervention in Earth’s climate system to limit adverse global warming. It involves two categories: Carbon-dioxide removal to reduce CO2 atmospheric concentrations; and solar radiation management to increase Earth’s reflectivity and reduce the outgoing infrared radiation from Earth’s surface that greenhouse gases (GHGs) absorb, resulting in warming.

The first lesson from the failed resolution is that we have no consensus on how to govern uncertainty. Uncertainties abound about the effectiveness, second-order impacts, safety and affordability of CGE technologies. The risks surrounding carbon removal are different from those related to solar geoengineering. For instance, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (a carbon removal idea) raises concerns about the vast land requirement. But injecting sulphate particles in the stratosphere has implications for rainfall in other regions. 

Whereas the US opposed clubbing carbon removal and solar geoengineering together, the EU argued that all CGE technologies merited caution. The proposed resolution rightly adopted a precautionary approach in calling for an assessment. The Convention on Biological Diversity had been even more cautious in 2010 when parties imposed a moratorium on geoengineering activities that may affect biodiversity. But opponents of the Swiss resolution, in particular the US and Saudi Arabia, opposed even this weakly limiting framework. If governance has to enable research to plug gaps in our knowledge, there must be a minimum understanding about the need for caution.

Secondly, attempts to define thresholds between emissions mitigation, climate adaptation and geoengineering will remain fraught. Within academic circles, scientists have tried to separate computer modelling, small-scale field experiments, large-scale experiments and eventual deployment. But the real worry for many countries is that CGE research will reduce incentives for mitigation. 

According to some sources, the US opposed the resolution because it suggested that geoengineering was not a substitute for emissions reduction. This is deeply problematic. Promised actions under the Paris Agreement on climate change are well below what is needed to stabilise temperature rise. If the largest polluters view CGE as even a potential substitute for mitigation, it signals grave injustice and an abandonment of any notion of historical responsibility. 

Thirdly, there is no consensus about the forum at which to discuss geoengineering. Neither codes of conduct for scientists to self-govern themselves nor solely national-level governance will suffice. If we are willing to contemplate technological interventions at a planetary scale, eventually we would have to contemplate political interactions — and disputes — at a planetary scale as well. 

Those opposing the UNEA resolution argued that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change were more relevant forums. The IPCC has no mandate to suggest governance options. There are other multilateral treaties that also have some relevance: the Montreal Protocol (to govern sulphate aerosols), the London Convention/ London Protocol (to govern ocean fertilisation), MARPOL (to govern marine cloud brightening), etc. But at which forum can countries ascertain incentives and motivations, or hold private interests accountable, or get legal recourse if something went wrong?

Opponents of CGE will question governance that enables further research (and possibly field experiments) as too permissive; proponents of CGE will question global governance that regulates scientific research as too restrictive. We are unlikely to find a single forum that will satisfy all parties on both technical relevance and political legitimacy. By its very nature, climate geoengineering will be debated across several venues.

The fourth lesson, therefore, is that transparency must form the bedrock of any conversation on CGE. Transparency has a dual role: Reduce public risk and build public trust. Timely and salient information about CGE research proposals, methodologies and funding is needed to reduce uncertainties about motivations. For any planned outdoor experiments, transparency is needed to secure prior informed consent from potentially impacted communities. Trans­parency about research results, direct impacts in controlling temperature rise, and associated impacts on precipitation, hydrological cycle, oceans and biodiversity is necessary (if not sufficient) to establish responsibility and liability for adverse transboundary consequences.

Climate geoengineering occupies both a rarefied world of climate science as well as the messy world of geopolitics. Currently, we have no means to legitimately weigh the risks of not acting against climate emergencies against the risks entailed in deploying controversial CGE methods. This is not a mere technical debate; it is high politics. We have no means today to govern this uncertainty.

The writer is CEO, Council on Energy, Environment and Water (http://ceew.in). In March, he briefed delegates of UNEA-4 on governance of climate geoenegineering. Follow @GhoshArunabha @CEEWIndia