T N Ninan: Pragmatic diplomacy?

Is India re-adjusting - that is, lowering - its sights in the context of a China-dominant Asia? We don't know, since this government communicates so little. But let's look at the straws in the wind. First, the defence minister says the armed forces must learn to do with less. Then come key decisions to pare down plans already announced. The Rafale fighter aircraft deal is reduced from 126 planes to a more affordable 36. The strength of the new mountain strike corps is cut from 90,000 soldiers to about 35,000, with its budget similarly pared. The logic is that one must cut one's coat according to the cloth available. That makes sense, of course, but does it mean the defence forces' threat perceptions have been lowered, too? In other words, that the coat might end up being too small to protect you from a Chinese blast? Perhaps the government hopes to deliver through diplomacy what it cannot afford in terms of arms purchases.

So what about diplomacy? The prime minister has consciously sought to play down conflict scenarios with China. In his interview to Time, Narendra Modi has pointed out that no shot has been fired across the Line of Actual Control in 25 years. That is true, but China has been increasingly assertive on Arunachal Pradesh, including issuing stapled visas, while India has not issued even a pro forma protest after China announced plans to build railway lines and pipelines through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Mr Modi acknowledges that it is legitimate for China to seek to increase its influence - this at a time when China is building frigates, fighter aircraft and submarines for Pakistan, and helping it with its nuclear and missile programmes (violating the international rules that Mr Modi cites). Bilateral trade is hopelessly unbalanced, while China continues to be protectionist in areas of Indian trade strength (like pharmaceuticals and software services).

It is not that India has been sitting idle. It moved quickly as a neighbour in its response to the Nepal earthquake, it has mended fences with the new Sri Lankan government, and it is at last moving on Chabahar port in Iran. Still, the softness on China is evident. Does this and the willingness that one senses to go along with Chinese initiatives like the Belt and Road signal a diplomatic recognition of changing power realities? If so, is there a conscious decision to step away from things like the Quadrilateral initiative (joint naval moves with the United States, Japan and Australia, which China dubbed an "Asian Nato")? Or will India display its "strategic autonomy" by walking on both legs?

India has been less than dogmatic in other forums, too. It has agreed to work on eliminating the use of HFCs (hydrofluorcarbons) under the Montreal Protocol, which gives no special treatment to poorer countries. Though India's laws to protect intellectual property are compliant with the requirements of the World Trade Organization, the government has signalled willingness to address US concerns in this area. Next in line could be softness on climate change issues, in the run-up to the Paris summit in December. Is there a Modi approach to foreign policy that is noticeably more accommodating than what people might have expected from a nationalist, "strong man" prime minister?

At the moment, these are just questions. And one must recognise that many in the government had argued even before Mr Modi that the creation of a fourth army strike corps was the wrong response, wasteful and ill-suited to the Chinese challenge; also, that the Rafale deal was always founded on unreal cost assumptions. Indeed some contend that a properly run, modern air force does not need the 40-plus fighter squadrons that anchor discussion about aircraft acquisition. The short point is that the country needs to better understand such issues, vital to its external security. But no one in the government is doing any explaining. All one can do, therefore is try to read the tea leaves.