Taking advantage of having a massive pool of citizens’ data, with no concerns over privacy, China has accorded the highest priority to developing its capabilities in AI. Its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan seeks to make the country the world leader in AI and associated technologies by 2030. Chinese overall spending on R&D was $376 billion in 2015, as compared to $13 billion in 1991 and exceeded the R&D expenditure of Japan, Germany and South Korea combined.
Technology is also at the centre of China’s military strategy. One key feature is that over the past two decades, China has pursued “civil-military fusion”, consciously applying technologies from the civilian sector, including those acquired from abroad for commercial purposes, to military applications. It has also utilised its cyber capabilities to gain access, through hacking, to cutting edge military technologies developed through years of research by US firms. US citizens of Chinese origin and Chinese scholars working in sensitive facilities have often been mobilised to clandestinely transfer confidential plans and blueprints to Chinese entities. However, this should not detract from the advances China is making in generating advanced technologies in its own research and technical institutions based on the vast knowledge pool that it has acquired over the years from multiple engagements with the US, Japan and Europe. As its technological capabilities have progressed, its military strategy has also undergone changes. In the first phase, China drew lessons from Operation Desert Storm in 1991, in which the US forces used Precision Guided Missiles (PGM) and integrated information networks to overwhelm the formidable conventional forces deployed by Iraq. This led to the concept of “informationised warfare” which impressed Chinese military planners who then determined to master it over time. The restructuring of the PLA to achieve “jointedness” among the land, sea and air forces and the integration of space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities have enabled seamless system platforms. In 1996, the Chinese felt humiliated by their powerlessness against the two US carrier groups that steamed into the Taiwan Straits after China began lobbing missiles around Taiwan as a show of force. China began developing asymmetric capabilities to make any similar US move in the future both risky and costly. The DF-21 D anti-carrier ballistic missile with a 1,000 mile range was the result. That the US acquiesced in China’s artificial island building in the South China Sea and its subsequent militarisation of these islands, may have convinced China that it now has those asymmetric capabilities in place. More recently, Chinese military strategists have been talking about moving towards “intelligentised warfare” using AI in weapons development and military tactics. If the earlier contestation was between informationised systems, the future they claim would be marked by “algorithmic competition”in which China believes it is racing ahead of the US.