Behind the 'Russia tilt'

Unpacking India's 'national interest', more than a year after the invasion

More than a year has passed since the armies of the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and in this period the Indian government’s apparent determination to remain neutral in the conflict only seems to have intensified. In fact, if anything “neutrality” is a code for “leaning towards Moscow” — since, for example, senior Russian ministers are regularly feted in New Delhi, but similar interactions with Ukraine are, to put it mildly, rare.

There are many reasons that could be given for this choice — and indeed, are given at tedious length and risible self-righteousness by people from government-friendly spokesmen to Sovietophile nostalgists of a certain age. Here are some:

• It isn’t our business, so why bother taking a position?
• What did the Ukrainians ever do for us anyway?
• Where was the West when Indian soldiers died on the Chinese border a few years ago?
• We are tired of the uppity Europeans lecturing us, and now they want to lecture us for not being on their side.
• The Americans leaned towards Pakistan in the 1971 war.
• We need the Russians for oil, for weapons, for their Security Council vote.
• The West can and will do nothing for us in a moment of crisis, so we need not do anything for them.

The astute reader will note there are fundamental differences between the first five reasons and the last two. While no doubt persuasive to many Indians, the first five are essentially emotional appeals. That some lack any relation to objective reality, and others are irrelevant to today’s choices, is therefore irrelevant. Some people will be swayed by them anyway.

The last two, however, are of greater interest. These are claims about present reality and therefore need to be scrutinised a little more carefully than they have been.

First of all, what are the concrete benefits that India receives from retaining a close bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation?

One unquestionable fact is that, over the past year, we have greatly increased the amount of oil we purchase. Russia has increased its share of crude oil imports into India and, in fact, according to the trade statistics for the last financial year that have just been published, it has climbed up the ranking of India’s trade partners overall as a consequence. However, one question can and should be asked: What is the value, in dollar terms, of the discount we have received on Russian oil? And what proportion of that has accrued, in the end, to the government’s balance sheet or added to consumer welfare through lower prices? A large proportion of this oil, after all, is being processed and then re-exported. Once that is removed from the equation, what is left? Given the centrality of cheaper oil to the justifications for the Russia tilt, the government should clarify this number.

It is also reasonable to ask if this energy partnership is sustainable over time. When current restrictions are removed, will it still make economic sense? As and when the People’s Republic of China puts into place the infrastructure required to increase its use of Russian fossil fuels, can India still rely on Russian supplies — especially in a crisis?

The question of Russian weaponry is a little more complicated. By some independent accounting, the stock of Indian weapons platforms that are of Russian origin is over 80 per cent. But what of the future? There is little or no doubt that the Russian military-industrial complex is going to be completely tied up for years to come replenishing their domestic arsenal. Can they be considered reliable partners in the future — if indeed they have been in the past decade?

Some in the Indian military establishment have also privately expressed concerns about the actual quality of Russian weaponry in practice. This is a natural consequence of their observations of how it has performed in practice in Ukraine. Some of these concerns might be unfair. After all, artillery platforms for example will only be as good as the training and experience of the crews using them, and many of Russia’s most experienced personnel perished in the opening months of the invasion. The broader questions of how India will manage its military requirements given our constrained budgets, the limitations of domestic production, and the complex geopolitical situation are beyond the scope of this column. But the notion that Russia can and will be central to India’s military preparedness in the decades to come is unlikely.

As for Russia’s support in the Security Council, the closer Moscow gets to Beijing, the less reliable a vote it will be. Non-alignment worked during the Cold War because India was not a direct target of either Moscow or Washington. In a 21st-century Cold War between Washington and Beijing in which the latter is seen as a strategic rival by New Delhi, it is harder to stay non-aligned. Russia clearly no longer is non-aligned in the new Cold War, so will it be a reliable partner for a country seeking to avoid alignments?

The final point, that India cannot and should not assume the West will come to its aid at a time of crisis, is a reasonable concern. However, I do have one counter-question: Is it wise to assume the West will not come to our aid? If so, is it sensible to go out of our way to alienate them, especially when low-cost rhetorical support would go a long way to avoid such alienation?

When taken in totality, these questions do suggest that our Russia tilt might not be, objectively, quite as much in India’s interest as some of our public statements have insisted. Maybe there are nevertheless good reasons to stay neutral for now. I accept, for example, that we need to minimise the possibilities for drama at the G20 summit later this year. But let us at least not accept, unquestioning, that the only reason to avoid taking a position on a blatant violation of national sovereignty is that it is in our national interest. That national interest is a lot less clear when one looks at the details.

The writer is head of the Economy and Growth Programme at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi