US steps back as global leader, sees continuity for India in Indo-Pacific

The new US national security strategy signals a retreat from global dominance while reaffirming continuity in India's role in Indo-Pacific security and Quad cooperation

It was reported several weeks ago that the Trump administration was working on a National Security Strategy (NSS) document that would reflect its foreign and security policy intent for the rest of the presidential tenure. Its release was delayed as the document’s propositions were contested by different constituencies, including the Maga (Make America Great Again) base, the traditional Republican Party elite, and the foreign policy and security establishment — which continues to wield influence, though this has diminished under the administration.

 

The ideological imprint of the Maga constituency is clear, for example, in the brazen attacks on European allies, targeting current governments as ideological adversaries. This is virtually a repeat of the vituperative criticism of governments of European mainstream political parties by United States Vice-President J D Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February this year. He accused them of undermining democratic principles by suppressing  right-wing political parties such as the AfD in Germany. Europe is said to be in danger of “civilisational erasure”, particularly for not following the anti-immigration policies of the Trump administration and thus being in danger of losing its European identity.

 

The European allies of the US are also accused of hampering the pursuit of peace in Ukraine, even though the people of Europe are said to support an end to the war. The NSS states as a key objective the need for “re-establishing strategic stability” between Europe and Russia. No wonder that Russia has welcomed the NSS as being aligned with its interests.

 

While the NSS cannot be taken as a guide to US foreign and security policy except in very broad terms, it does reflect a certain altered mindset in engaging Europe. The notion of a coherent West has ceased to exist, confronting Europe with an existential crisis.

 

The NSS confirms the shift of strategic focus to the western hemisphere. Uncontested hegemony over the western hemisphere, from the Arctic to Antarctica, branded as the “Trump corollary” of the Monroe doctrine, is presented as key to the US remaining a front-ranking power. This doctrine was established by President James Monroe in 1823 to exclude any European or external power from exercising influence in the Americas. Mr Trump is claiming to resurrect that policy. The ongoing show of massive military force against Venezuela is a demonstration of that intent.

 

Alongside this hemispheric shift is an explicit rejection of the objective of retaining a position of global dominance for itself; instead there is an embrace of a balance of power in other geopolitical theatres and this would include the Indo-Pacific.

 

“As the United States rejects the ill-fated concept of global domination for itself, we must prevent the global, and in some cases even regional dominations of others (note: making an implicit exception for itself in the western hemisphere).”

 

Then follows an extraordinary statement, reflecting hopes of co-opting other major powers, in managing world affairs:

 

“The outsize influence of larger, richer and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations. This reality sometimes entails working with partners to thwart ambitions that threaten our joint interests.”

 

This is the backdrop to the repeated calls by

 

Mr Trump for reinstating Russia into the G-7 and inviting China into the grouping.

 

The NSS has no separate section on the Indo-Pacific, unlike the NSS adopted in the first Trump administration in 2017, which articulated an elaborate Indo-Pacific strategy, in which the revival of the “Quadrilateral (US, Australia, Japan and India)” played a critical role. Instead we have a section entitled “Asia: Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation.” There is a recognition that the Indo-Pacific is “already and will continue to be among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds”. The US has to compete successfully in the Indo-Pacific and for this purpose, President Trump is credited with “building alliances and strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific that will be the bedrock of security and prosperity long into the future.”

 

It would be reassuring to India and its Quad partners that the NSS commits the US to “improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan and the United States (“the Quad”). Moreover, we will also work to align the actions of our allies and partners with our joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation.”

 

While China is not mentioned in this context, it is clearly the target. However, this must be tempered by the essentially economic and technological dimension of the projected competition with China, success in which would permit more effective deterrence. There is a reference to “preserving military overmatch” being a priority. This “overmatch” is spelt out in the capacity of the US and its allies to “deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavourable to us as to make defending the island impossible.”

 

This comes close to a commitment to defend Taiwan against attack by China. The issue of North Korea is ignored as a security concern.

 

In general, global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and pandemics do not find any mention. Multilateral institutions and approaches are regarded as detractions from the exercise of national sovereignty.

 

What are key takeaways from the NSS?

 

One, there is an explicit retreat from the US’s global role but an assertion of uncontested dominance of the western hemisphere, comprising the Americas and their immediate peripheries.

 

Two, there is a reframing of the concept of the West, not only by imagining but actively working for a Europe that is ideologically and strategically aligned with the US; it concedes a Russian role in any European security architecture.

 

Three, there is an expectation of great powers, who may have adversarial relations, to be partners in managing global affairs. This justifies the outreach to China and Russia as great powers.

 

Four, there is greater continuity in the approach to the Indo-Pacific and India’s role in the preservation of security in this geopolitical space is reaffirmed.

         

The author is a former foreign secretary