What Chinese archives reveal about the 1962 war

How India and China came close to avoiding a war before domestic politics got in the way

Chinese foreign ministry archives were briefly accessible from 2004 to 2012. One set of documents of interest to us relates to the 1961-65 period, which were thrown open in 2008. Though they were heavily redacted, they provided a window into decision-making processes, including on events leading up to the 1962 India-China border conflict.

 

One has read through reports from sources who had access to those archives, and in this article I want to focus on the July 22 and 23, 1962, meetings in Geneva between V K Krishna Menon, India’s defence minister at the time, and Chinese vice premier Chen Yi. Their conversations are important because, had they been followed up, the subsequent border war may perhaps have been avoided. That is speculative but credible.

 

Krishna Menon’s remarks are summarised hereafter:

 

Menon reportedly says to Chen Yi that if the India-China boundary problem is not solved before Nehru’s death, it will drag on further. The dispute between the two sides started with the Aksai Road; therefore, resolution of this problem should also begin from this road. We should forget about the past and start drawing a fresh line in the western sector — that is, the relevant territory, including the road and the areas on the two sides of the road, could be drawn as Chinese territory, and in exchange, China can demarcate to India a part of the territory in the eastern sector, which is considered by everybody as Chinese territory.

 

The size of the territory need not be equal. In the eastern sector, China has already withdrawn from Longju, and India has not re-entered as a gesture of peace. As a result, there is no problem in the eastern sector anymore. If the boundary problem can be resolved like this, the two sides can sign a Treaty of Friendship for 50 years and start trade.

 

Chen Yi rejected the proposal saying that what Menon was proposing would mean China giving up 90,000 sq kms of its territory in the east and also portions of its territory in the west. In addition, India wants another piece of Chinese territory to be handed over to it. This was unacceptable.

 

According to another reference one has seen in the Chinese archives, the Chinese territory to be handed over to the Indian side in exchange was the Chumbi Valley, a tongue of Chinese territory extending into north-east India.

 

Menon then proposed that in order to prevent border conflict, the above arrangement could be considered a temporary one while the two sides maintained their respective positions. He then spelt out these temporary arrangements in some detail, which indicates that they must have been arrived at after some high-level consultations on the Indian side. Here is what he proposed, according to the archives:

 

The two sides could agree to let the border security forces of both sides freely set up sentry posts in the disputed areas in the western sector. There would be definite restrictions on the strength of both sides’ security posts. The strength of one side’s sentry post ought not to be several times that of the other side, and neither side should attack the other side. In addition, a distance of 1-2 miles should be maintained between the sentry posts. After two to three years some territorial adjustments could again be considered.

 

What is most interesting is that while Chen Yi expressed reservations over Menon’s proposals, he expressed the willingness of the Chinese side to consider temporary arrangements to avoid conflict. He asked for another meeting the next morning to pursue the matter further.

 

Chen Yi must have consulted with Chinese leaders in the meantime and, in the second meeting on July 23, while again expressing reservations, declared himself open to considering “temporary arrangements” as a means of avoiding conflict. He observed that both China and India were not willing to fight, which was a common point, and that both sides would first be discussing ways to avoid conflict. He then proposed — and this is important — that he and Menon issue a communique in Geneva on discussions between China and India on the prevention of border conflict. The time and level of the discussions could be decided later.

 

Menon then turned cautious as perhaps he may have gone beyond his brief. He said that the two ministers should report their discussions on temporary arrangements to their respective governments and the communique could be issued by the two governments. The communique could refer to their talks in Geneva and agree to hold a dialogue to avoid border conflict.

 

On his return to Delhi, Menon briefed Nehru and the Cabinet only after six days. There is no record of the discussions available in the public domain, but a press report says that further talks were ruled out for the present and that the ministers expected the stalemate to continue. We know that both Nehru and Menon were facing considerable political opposition from both within the Congress Party and the Opposition on the China policy.

 

One can only speculate on whether the proposed talks on “temporary arrangements”, which would have been in the nature of confidence-building measures, could have avoided war. The fact that Chen Yi swiftly grasped the opportunity offered by Menon to avoid a conflict is noteworthy.

 

From other sources we know that it was at a Politbureau meeting in August that Mao forced a decision to go to war with India against the opposition of “some comrades”. The latter had argued that China was facing an acute economic crisis in the aftermath of the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine of 1959-62. It was facing the hostility of both the US and the Soviet Union. Making an enemy of India at this juncture, they argued, would not be in China’s interest. Mao overruled them and, according to one account, denounced some of the group as “right opportunists”.

 

This is one of the “what-ifs” of history. If Menon and Chen Yi had issued their joint communique or if Nehru’s Cabinet endorsed Menon’s initiative, perhaps the train of events leading up to the 1962 border war may have followed a different trajectory.

 

The writer  is a former foreign secretary