India's Bangladesh options: Measured responses will serve New Delhi better

Escalating violence and a rampup in anti-Indian rhetoric in Bangladesh ahead of elections have raised the stakes for New Delhi in shaping an appropriate response. After the death of a prominent student leader on December 19, seven days after he had sustained a wound from a shootout in Dhaka allegedly by an Awami League activist, the wave of violence that followed focused on minorities. That included the lynching of a Hindu garment worker on December 18 and the targeting of assets of the Indian government. So far, India’s response has been low-key. Visa-related service has been suspended in Khulna, Rajshahi, and, most recently, at its assistant high commission in Chittagong after protestors gathered outside. But the trading of charges over reciprocal threats to each other’s consular facilities has undeniably upped the ante in already fragile India-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi’s approach, therefore, increasingly demands a focus on its immediate and long-term security perceptions.  

 

For India, the political situation in Bangladesh is poised between Dhaka’s growing proximity to Pakistan and China. With national elections scheduled for February 12, it is becoming increasingly clear that Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s “chief advisor”, wields minimal control over the “interim government”, which is determining the country’s trajectory right now. Buoyed up by overt Pakistani support, the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami, which gained negligible votes in national elections in the past, appears to be gaining traction over the relatively secular student movement, which had initially played a role in Sheikh Hasina’s ouster as Prime Minister last year. In January this year, the chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, led a senior delegation to Dhaka to strengthen intelligence-sharing ties — the first such visit since 1989. In March, Mr Yunus broke tradition by making his first inaugural visit to China instead of India. The visit yielded a raft of economic collaborations and a deepening of defence ties. Adding a layer of complexity is the fact that India continues to provide shelter to Sheikh Hasina and has not acted on a formal extradition request after she was sentenced in absentia for “crimes against humanity”.

 

The growing anti-Indian movement has added an element of uncertainty to the safety of Indian economic assets too. The interim government has assured India of the security of its assets and personnel but the growing intensity of civil unrest has disrupted supply chains, especially in Bangladesh’s signature textile sector, in which around a quarter of the units are owned by Indians. Indian-owned fast-moving consumer goods firms have seen markets dwindle, and with Bangladeshis increasingly suspending travel out of security concerns, India’s medical-tourism business has seen a notable slump. Given this sharp deterioration with a country once considered a dependable ally, India’s options are limited. There are, to be sure, several calls for New Delhi to exercise its heft as a major power and opt for some version of “neutralising” intervention to ensure the accession of a friendly regime. Doing so would not, however, be an optimal answer, not least because the objective is unclear. Regime change is an undesirable playbook at any time, and there is considerable opacity around the strength of pro-Indian forces to warrant such an exercise. A more measured response would be to ensure the safety of Indian citizens in Bangladesh, continuing engagement with the forces of moderation, and avoiding a popular temptation to communalise a volatile situation. History has shown that temperance has served India better than activist intervention.