Nato @ 75

The transatlantic alliance seeks a global role

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), the world’s largest peacetime military alliance, turns 75 today (April 4), it faces challenges within and beyond its transatlantic borders. The alliance, formed as a security bulwark by 12 countries — the US, Canada, and 10 western European countries — against Soviet expansionism (embodied in the Warsaw Pact), has found growing post-Cold War relevance against the neo-imperialist aims of post-Soviet Russia under Vladimir Putin. Today, Nato has 32 members, and it is no coincidence that the major enlargements occurred in 2004, four years after Mr Putin began his first term. In that year, former Soviet countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; former Warsaw Pact countries Bulgaria and Romania; and Slovakia and Slovenia became its members. Three former Warsaw Pact countries — Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic — had signed on in 1999. Mr Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened these impulses.

Finland, which shares a 1,340-km border with Russia, and Sweden, jettisoning a century of neutrality, applied to join in May 2022, gaining membership in May 2023 and in March 2024, respectively. This steady eastward enlargement has been the centre of Mr Putin’s conception of Western perfidy (citing a non-existent commitment from the US not to expand Nato) and justification for invading Ukraine, a country he claims has historically been an integral part of Russia and which had sought both Nato and European Union membership. Unsurprisingly, it is the Russia factor that is driving current controversies within Nato, as Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general since 2014, steps down. Last month, the President of Romania, which shares a border with Russia, threw his hat in the ring for the post, pitting himself against the outgoing Dutch Prime Minister, who is considered a shoo-in. Now, the Baltic countries, all Russia-bordering countries, too have forwarded their candidates.
 

But even as Russia’s European ambitions continue to engage Nato, the less noticed aspect of the alliance has been its steady global reach, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, where it seeks to confront the rise of China. The alliance, thus, recognises a number of partners across the globe, among them Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, and Colombia (although it does consult non-partners such as India and China on regional security dynamics). More countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are in its sights. In the immediate context, Nato’s willingness to continue to underwrite Ukraine’s defence against a resurgent Russia-China axis and the West Asian crisis will shape its future, particularly with US appetite for helping Kyiv waning and continued support for Israel causing ructions within the alliance. The very real prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House in November adds to its predicament. Mr Trump has been vocal about declining to come to the aid of a European state if it is attacked — the founding principle of the alliance — unless Nato partners step up their own funding. His relationships with Mr Putin and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu raise doubts about the US’ role in Nato. Accordingly, Nato is planning a five-year $100 billion military aid package to shield Ukraine from the “winds of change” in the event of a Trump presidency. How successfully it manages this exercise will be a major test of strength in the emerging global security architecture.