Simultaneous polls: Gains must be weighed against Constitutional concerns

On Tuesday, the Union government introduced in the Lok Sabha the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill to enable simultaneous elections to the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the state Assemblies. A separate Bill was also introduced to enable simultaneous elections in the Union Territories with Assemblies. As expected, the Opposition, led by the Congress, weighed in against the proposed amendments, largely on the grounds that they violated the basic-structure doctrine of the Constitution and were beyond the legislative competence of the House. The Opposition also raised other objections such as additional powers envisioned in the Bill for the Election Commission of India. Since constitutional amendments require a special majority in both Houses of Parliament, all proposed provisions are expected to be discussed in detail. The Bill is expected to be referred to a joint parliamentary committee.

 

The idea of holding simultaneous elections is not new for India. In fact, elections for many years after Independence were held simultaneously. The cycle was disturbed after Assemblies were prematurely dissolved, starting in the late 1960s, largely for political reasons. Various bodies, including the Law Commission, have suggested going back to synchronised elections. More recently, a high-level committee under the chairmanship of former President Ram Nath Kovind unanimously endorsed the idea and recommended the way forward, which is reflected in the Bill introduced. In principle, it makes sense to conduct simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and the Assemblies. Besides the expenditure incurred by both the Indian state and political parties during elections, there is a broader policy dimension that needs attention. Once elections are done and governments are formed at both Union and state levels, political parties can get back to governance and policy issues. Given the competitive nature of politics, which is a great strength of India, the conduct of political parties on both sides of the aisle is often determined by impending state elections. Further, the technical analysis presented by the Kovind committee showed that growth, inflation, investment, and public expenditure outcomes tend to be better following simultaneous elections.

 

However, the way envisaged for simultaneous elections needs to be debated threadbare. It will also be important to consider the unintended consequences of making the proposed amendments to the Constitution. The Bill, for instance, proposes that the five years from the first meeting of the Lok Sabha will be referred to as the full term of the House. If the House is dissolved before the completion of the full term, the period between the date of dissolution and five years from the date of the first sitting will be termed the unexpired term. A new House will be constituted after elections only for the unexpired term of the immediately preceding House.

 

Theoretically, if the House is dissolved four years after the first sitting, the new House will be constituted only for a year. Given that the electoral process takes time, the term of the House may potentially be less than a year. Such outcomes might influence the choices of political parties. It is possible that, hypothetically, the Opposition may not bring a motion of no confidence after a certain point during the term of the House. Consequently, a government may stay unchanged even after evidently losing the confidence of the House. A similar thing can happen in states as well. Besides, the possibility of two or more elections to the Lok Sabha or Assemblies within five years in the case of dissolutions somewhat weakens the economic argument for simultaneous elections. Parliament will need to debate all such possibilities.