What Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman will present on February 1, 2027, will be her ninth consecutive Union Budget (excluding one interim Budget). Quite apart from the fact that the 2027-28 Budget will make Ms Sitharaman the finance minister to have produced the most Union Budgets, it will also present perhaps her biggest challenge: Maintaining fiscal prudence while propping up the growth engine to benefit all sections of society. Concerns over demand and investments have become as important as the challenges arising from jobs and wages. Official numbers on unemployment show a marginal decline, along with an increase in the labour force participation rate, but real wages have either stagnated or even fallen for a large number of workers in the last decade. External sector problems look a little more manageable with the recent decline in international crude-oil prices, but a widening trade deficit in merchandise goods reflects weaknesses afflicting manufacturing and exporting firms, particularly those in the medium and small sector.
Data for the Union government’s revenue and expenditure during the first half of 2026-27 is available. A look at these numbers points to a few worrying signals. Questions are bound to arise regarding the Union government’s ability to meet its fiscal deficit target of 4.3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026-27.
Tepid growth in net tax revenue in the first half of the current year at less than 4 per cent is the first cause of concern. The full-year’s net tax revenue growth target was over 9 per cent. Non-tax revenues and miscellaneous non-debt capital receipts (or revenue from disinvestment and asset monetisation) have done well. Non-tax revenues grew by 3 per cent even though the full-year’s projection under this head envisaged no increase, while receipts from disinvestment more than doubled against a much lower target of increasing it by about 35 per cent. However, this is no real comfort. Non-tax revenues and disinvestment receipts account for less than a fifth of the government’s total projected non-debt receipts for 2026-27.
A bigger concern is the pace of expenditure growth in the first half of the current year. Against an annual budgeted target of 9 per cent, the growth in the government’s total expenditure was close to 11 per cent. Growth in revenue expenditure was about 10 per cent, against the annual target of less than 8 per cent, and capital expenditure in the first half of 2026-27 grew by 13 per cent, a shade lower than the annual target of 14 per cent. This is not a healthy sign, particularly when private-sector investments have not yet gained the desired momentum.
The government’s fiscal performance in the first half of 2026-27 reveals yet another problem. At the start of the year, it had announced a brave plan to cut subsidies by about 10 per cent over what was spent in 2025-26, although it was not clear how that reduction would be achieved. Even if there were some plans to cut subsidies, those were dashed about a month after the Budget was presented, when the war in West Asia led to a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fourth of global crude oil and gas supplies pass.
Not only did international crude-oil prices spike, but even supplies of oil and gas were adversely affected. Fertiliser prices too shot up. This poured cold water on the government’s plans to cut its major subsidies, almost 45 per cent of which are accounted for by fertilisers and petroleum products. Prices of crude oil and fertilisers have now fallen and stabilised. But even before prices came down, the government managed its fertiliser subsidies quite well. In the first half of 2026-27, fertiliser subsidy growth was restricted to 11 per cent (largely due to linking fertiliser sales to farmers’ land holdings with the help of Agristack and other similar digital platforms) and even the growth in the food subsidies bill was reined in at about 17 per cent.
Remember that the petroleum subsidies bill was kept under check because the oil companies absorbed the impact of higher crude-oil prices, helped as they were by the government move to reduce excise duty on petroleum products, mainly petrol and diesel. State-controlled oil companies took a hit as a result, as did the government’s net tax revenues and prospects of dividend income from them. Going forward, this cannot be good news for the Union government’s fiscal consolidation plan.
Already, the government’s fertiliser subsidies bill by the second week of November 2026 has reportedly risen to ₹1.46 trillion, almost 85 per cent of the budgeted allocation under this head for the full year. It is clear that the government’s major subsidies outlay of ₹4.1 trillion will be exceeded by a good margin by the time the current year ends. With net tax revenues growth a little subdued and expenditure slippages almost certain, can the government meet its fiscal deficit target of 4.3 per cent of GDP?
To its credit, the government has in the past few years generally refrained from seeking recourse to imaginative accounting techniques, and instead embraced transparent accounting practices. Hopefully, the government will continue to stay on course in this regard. More importantly, however, the government may not be under any pressure to employ such techniques as issuing oil bonds many years ago or tapping extra budgetary resources through fully-serviced government bonds until five years ago.
This is because the government’s own ability to spend the resources allocated by it during the year is limited. Over the years, its absorptive capacity to spend the entire money allocated under various important schemes has remained poor. In 2025-26, actual total expenditure by the government was about 3 per cent short of what was budgeted at the start of the year. If a similar saving of 3 per cent is achieved in 2026-27, the government would enjoy an expenditure cushion of about ₹1.6 trillion. This could absorb a good part of the likely revenue shortfall (which will be lower because of a sharp increase in disinvestment receipts) and even the slippage in subsidies expenditure.
Two messages emerge from this. One, the government should not be unduly worried about its performance on the fiscal consolidation front. Even though its revenues do not match up to its targets and subsidies bill exceeds the budgeted amount, it will continue to enjoy the benefit of expenditure savings and keep the fiscal deficit from becoming much wider than the target.
Two, while preparing the 2027-28 Budget, it should be more focused on instilling a degree of realism and pragmatism in preparing its expenditure plan. An economy that needs to grow faster requires more investment and proper expenditure planning, particularly in key infrastructure areas.