After the United Kingdom’s withdrawal in the late 1960s created a security vacuum, the United States (US) became the Gulf monarchies’ chief protector. That role deepened after the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. But as US focus shifted to the Indo-Pacific, Gulf states hedged against unreliability. Economic prosperity and global links made dependence on one patron increasingly unacceptable.
The old model of outsourced security began giving way to search for strategic autonomy. Saudi outreach to Iran, the UAE’s ties with China, and the independent diplomacy of Oman and Qatar reflected this shift. Saudi Arabia refused to align with Israel after October 2025, casting doubt on the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also diverged over Yemen, each seeking to pursue its own strategic interests.
However, the 2023 Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement, built on the belief that economic interdependence could soften political hostility, failed decisively. Despite rising trade, renewed diplomatic ties, and efforts to avoid Gulf escalation, Iran struck Saudi. Even Qatar and Oman, the region’s most committed mediators, were hit by Iranian missiles.
The current crisis has made it clear that the US security relationship is contingent on Washington’s domestic politics and shifting global priorities. The US’ use of force in the region is on its own terms, for its own objectives, and on its own timeline and not to Gulf preferences. Worse, it is the Gulf that must bear the consequences of any American action.
China’s primary interest in West Asia is energy flows and market access, not regional security. China is the world’s largest LNG importer, with Qatar and the UAE supplying about 30 per cent of its LNG imports. But Iran is also China’s largest regional trading partner, and the 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership made Iran part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Those deep ties divide China’s interests in any Gulf crisis.
Türkiye’s divided support makes it unreliable. It seeks influence across the Arab world, retains links with Muslim Brotherhood networks, invokes Ottoman nostalgia, and pursues assertive ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and West Asia.
Against a backdrop of broken alliances and misaligned interests, India’s relationship with West Asia is fundamentally different. It rests on five millennia of civilisational continuity. Indus Valley merchants and the dhow routes linking Kozhikode and Muscat predate every modern state in the region. Many among India’s 170 million-plus Muslims retain deep social and familial ties with the Gulf. Over 9.5 million Indians, including 3.5 million in the UAE, live and work in West Asia. For millions of Indian Muslim families, the Hejaz is a lifelong ambition. Bollywood commands vast Gulf audiences. Indian cuisine is ubiquitous from Dubai to Muscat. Indian languages are heard in Gulf souks as naturally as Arabic. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is India’s largest regional trading bloc, accounting for 15.4 per cent of India’s trade in FY25. West Asia supplies over 60 per cent of India’s crude imports, while 80 per cent of India’s external trade passes through the region. The 2022 India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, concluded in just 88 days, underlines both shared interests and historic trust. The 2023 India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor envisions a trade spine linking India through the Gulf to Europe, reinforcing historical trade links.
India has, however, been slow to add a security dimension to its relationship. Even though joint military exercises are conducted, India does not have an operational security relationship as it has with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, the Philippines or Mauritius.
The current crisis raises the question whether India and the Gulf should consciously elevate their relationship to a strategic one. India has no territorial ambitions in the region. It does not have a history of using the region as a proxy battlefield for its own contests with rivals. India’s deep civilisational and demographic ties create genuine mutual interest in stability. It has a growing economic presence. And above all, India has the diplomatic credibility to maintain relationships with all parties, the Gulf states, Iran, Israel, and the global powers. India is the only significant power that all parties trust, or at least do not distrust.
India does not have to be the region’s security guarantor. Possibly something more durable: A deeper India-Gulf strategic partnership, where India has a stake in Gulf security and the Gulf in India’s economic rise. The framework for this could include an India-Gulf security and maritime compact focused on naval coordination, maritime domain awareness, anti-drone defence, cybersecurity, and protection of sea lanes in the region. It could also encompass an India-Gulf defence industrial partnership through joint ventures in drones, missile systems, cyber and artificial intelligence surveillance, secure communications, and maintenance hubs, combining Gulf capital with India’s growing defence innovation ecosystem. Indian startups could be scaled with government backing, while systems such as the BrahMos missile could strengthen Gulf security. An energy-to-technology corridor could cover strategic petroleum reserves, LNG, green hydrogen, semiconductors, and critical minerals. The accelerated implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor could be supported through ports, logistics zones and rail links. Finally, India’s Unified Payments Interface could be integrated with Gulf financial networks.
The Gulf’s broken security compass, if read honestly, points towards India.
The author is chairman, UPSC, and former defence secretary. The views are personal
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