Small demographic window

New fertility estimates must define govt's priorities

Well-respected medical journal Lancet had produced a major study in 2021, known as the “Global Burden of Diseases”, which included careful assessments of current and future fertility globally, regionally, and for individual countries. A further comprehensive analysis of the underlying demographics of this study has now been released by the journal. Age-specific fertility rates were estimated from the survey data and censuses, and then aggregated across age cohorts to estimate the total fertility rate, or TFR, for a population. The headline news as far as India is concerned is that the TFR is expected to fall sharply by 2050. Indeed, over the course of the century from 1950 to 2050, the fertility rate in India is estimated to fall from 6.2 children per woman in 1950 to about 1.3 in 2050. This is of course well below the recognised “replacement rate”, at which populations are static, of 2.1 children per woman. If the trends continue in the second half of the century, then the fertility rate at the turn of the 21st century might approach one child per woman. By that time, of course, almost all countries in the world will be below the replacement rate, with only a few exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa.

While the depth of this descent may come as a surprise, the direction of travel surely must not. Indeed, in 2021, India was technically already below the replacement rate for its population. The TFR in India in that year was estimated as being 1.9. However it is important to note that the Indian data suggests the TFR varies widely across the country. Some states, especially those where the status of women is more advanced, have particularly low TFR rates already. Others, including in the less developed rural north, are still well above the replacement rate — though here, too, the trend is downward. The original Lancet survey noted India would likely end this century as the world’s largest country in terms of population by some considerable distance. China’s population will have shrunk sharply, and although sub-Saharan countries — particularly Nigeria — will have gained millions of people, only India will have a population over a billion. Yet there are multiple challenges thrown up by this trend that will need to be anticipated by policy. Two in particular should be identified.

The first is the political challenge of varying demographics across geography. If one part of the country is shrinking and another still growing, then their political weight in a democracy will alter. This throws up federal challenges that must be dealt with sensitively by the Indian political class. The second question is one of economic growth. Countries that move out of middle-income status do so by ensuring that the generations that represent their demographic dividend are also those that see sharply increasing productivity. This happened both in Europe and in East Asian countries. For India, the time to ensure a productive workforce is now. The next few decades are crucial; by 2050, the country will already be over the demographic hill. Thus education, upskilling, and investment have to be the priorities of the government over the next few years. The demographic data underlines the idea that India has only a small window of opportunity to become a developed nation. If this chance is not seized, then the country is condemned to low middle-income status forever.