Supreme Court ruling redefines governor's role in state legislation

Relations between state governments and governors, who are appointed by the Union government, have sequentially broken down in recent years, particularly in states not run by the National Democratic Alliance. This period is reminiscent of the last time a single party was politically dominant. During the Congress’ period of dominance, governors were too often seen as a tool for interference in state politics in order to disadvantage local non-Congress parties. Returning to such a dynamic would dangerously destabilise federalism in this country. It is, therefore, welcome that the Supreme Court has used its rarely exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to prune back the role of the governor. In a case dealing with the actions of Tamil Nadu Governor R N Ravi, it has indicated that Bills passed by the Assembly cannot be indefinitely denied the governor’s assent. Such a pocket veto would, in the court’s opinion, thwart “the will of the people” as expressed through the democratically elected legislature. It is the members of Assemblies, the court points out in its judgment, who are “better attuned to ensure the well-being of the people”. As a consequence, 10 Bills the governor had effectively shelved — even though they had been passed, re-presented, and passed again by the Tamil Nadu Assembly — are deemed to have already become law by the court. Since the governor did not act bona fide, his actions are deemed not to have occurred.

 

There should be two different sets of consequences of this case, one specific to this particular issue and one general. Specifically, the Tamil Nadu governor’s position has now become untenable. The apex court has directly indicated that the governor’s actions impinge upon democratic expression. At a broader level, the relationship between state legislatures and the governor has now been reset to the advantage of the former. It is often tempting to use the nominal powers of the governor as a mechanism of interference. But they are not meant to be real; as the court has reiterated, governors must always and mandatorily act on the aid and advice of the state government, and have no recourse to their own discretion in matters of legislation. They are there as the ceremonial representative of the Union, and as a constitutional backup in the case of a breakdown of the local machinery of government. They do not serve any purpose that would justify their overruling the Legislative Assembly in any respect.

 

Such a reset is overdue, and it is to be hoped that all parties will now be more respectful of the circumscribed role of the governor. They should not be treated by the state political machinery as a political enemy, as has too often been the case in the recent past. Nor should they behave as if they have been appointed to block the legislature’s exercise of its powers, whether directly or through the misuse of processes such as the governor’s assent. Political battles in India should not be fought through constitutional positions but through mass campaigns and the ballot box.