The Myanmar puzzle

India must rethink its traditional position

As the war between Israel and Hamas in West Asia dominates global attention, a forgotten civil war raging in the southeast of the continent is shaping up as a test for China, the United States (US), and India. In Myanmar a military coup against Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy has escalated into a war against the country’s long-running insurgencies. The Tatmadaw, or military, is a powerful institution with entrenched economic interests and, till recently, robust support from China, which sees Myanmar as an integral component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Recent developments have altered the state of play with insurgents such as the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) and other groups scoring significant gains in key areas along India and China’s borders. These developments have shifted the balance of big power advantage towards China, leaving India in urgent need of reassessing its options in Myanmar.

Over the past several months, the 3BA, comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA), unleashed a campaign named “Operation 1027”, which captured a significant border town in the Shan state, which was emerging as a critical entrepot on a BRI route. Hundreds of kilometres west, Khampat, a trading post along the Manipur border and straddling the Asian Highway, a long unfinished India-led project to link India, Myanmar, and Thailand, was captured as part of the same operation. Weeks later, another insurgent group, the Chin National Army, wrested Rikhawdar, a border town opposite Mizoram’s Zokhawthar, a formal trading-point between the two countries. It was this action that saw Chin State civilians and junta soldiers taking refuge in India. These victories have put the junta on the back foot and China in pole position and muddied the waters for India. When hostilities broke out, sanctions made the US deeply unpopular even as China gained in prestige with the junta. India sought to retain its traditional relations with the Tatmadaw, but this position confounded the outreach to insurgent groups.

Beijing, by maintaining its outreach with multiple insurgent groups (not just the 3BA), has sought to protect its economic interests and deepen its geo-political engagement in Myanmar. It is widely recognised, for instance, that “Operation 1027” could not have taken place without Chinese support, including its blind eye to drug-running and other illicit activities that finance insurgency. China’s proactive approach is driven by the fact that overland trade accounts for a larger proportion of its trade with Myanmar than it does for India. This, coupled with the snail’s pace of progress on the Asian Highway and the malfunctioning of formal trade crossings, worsened by the crisis in Manipur, has done little to push India’s interests in Myanmar. Now China has called for a ceasefire and spoken of the spirit of friendship between the two countries. India needs to adopt strategic pragmatism and flexibility in addressing a fluid and complex situation in Myanmar. In this context, India would do well to rethink its traditional alignment on Myanmar with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which wields no power or influence in the country, and engage more pragmatically with the emerging power players in this troubled but critical neighbour.