Turkiye has a geographical and institutional foothold in Europe and West Asia. It is a founding member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, but it is also the largest Nato member after the US. In the recent past, it has fully flexed its powers in delaying the entry of Finland and Sweden as Nato members. Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, Ankara has been strengthening its Islamic credentials, playing key roles in Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, in which it occasionally clashed with the US, its ostensible ally in these regions, over support to local Kurdish militias. Its decision to buy Russian fighter aircraft and air defence systems added to tensions exacerbated by diplomatic friction over US-backed Israel’s action in Gaza. This latest alliance brings together a nuclear-armed country (Pakistan), a nation rapidly expanding its military-industrial complex (particularly in drone and unmanned-aerial-vehicle technology), and the most powerful Arab nation.
The US’ manifest inability to subdue Iran or its regional proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and increasingly Iraq, or to defend allies in Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, or Saudi Arabia from Iranian attacks has significantly contributed to creating a new pole in West Asia against the aggression of Israel, the sole US-sponsored nuclear power in the region. A potential US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement has been stalled because of US President Donald Trump’s condition that Saudi Arabia sign the Abraham Accords and normalise relations with Israel, and Riyadh’s insistence that recognition of Israel was contingent on progress towards Palestinian statehood. With the US running short of precision-guided weaponry, Oman and Iran independently discussing mutually beneficial ways of operationalising the Strait of Hormuz, Israel persisting with attacks on Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and Iran arming Yemen’s Houthis against Saudi Arabia, the test for this latest triple alliance could come sooner rather than later.
Though the agreement is not India-focused, it has implications for New Delhi. First, India’s increasing support for Israel can impact its traditional close ties with the Arab world, which remains a significant supplier of fossil fuel and a destination for exports and labour. The second factor concerns cross-border terrorism. This agreement comes just 15 months after Pakistan-sponsored attacks on civilians in Pahalgam precipitated retaliation in the form of Operation Sindoor. This mode of response could become more challenging after this “West Asian Nato” agreement. The Indian diplomatic establishment needs to find ways to deal with the evolving geopolitical landscape.