After the storm
In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, the response of Myanmar’s military government was fiercely criticised. This book joins that chorus, but diplomat Bhaskar Mitra says the criticism is undeserved
The book reminds me of the horns of a bull — a point here and a point there, with nothing in the middle. Using selective vision the author has recorded “eyewitness accounts whenever possible”, used reports from anonymous people, anecdotal evidence and “many rumours that are continuously circulating throughout the country”. The author has also relied on some groups (local, international and multilateral) that gave distorted accounts borne out of their frustration at having been denied any meaningful role in the post-Nargis scenario.
Sadly, the author’s determination to criticise and defame the government of Myanmar reduces the book to the level of poor propaganda. Those with an open mind who lived through the nightmare of Nargis and the terrible days that followed cannot but respect the tremendous response of the government of Myanmar, the monks and the people. In the author’s words, “Cyclone Nargis had been a disaster of epic proportions.” There will always be shortcomings in the response to such catastrophe, but the shortcomings of the government of Myanmar were few and pale into insignificance when compared to the US government’s response to Hurricane Katrina.
The government met in the early hours of May 3, 2008, about six hours after the cyclone had subsided, took stock of the situation and put an emergency plan into operation. Within 24 hours after the cyclone, military personnel had reached the worst-affected areas and the initial rescue and relief operation was on its way within 48 hours.
The people also responded with remarkable speed. Wealthy businessmen and many local companies started their own rescue and relief operations. Within 24 hours young volunteers with provisions were sailing down to the worst-affected areas. People were donating provisions to monasteries and these in turn were being sent to monasteries in the delta area, where large numbers of affected people had taken shelter.
The author states that “the destruction in the city [Yangon] was catastrophic and... although the state media had announced that soldiers and policemen were being deployed throughout Yangon to clear up the storm damage — only very occasionally was there any evidence of their activities and, even then, they were never very industrious or effective”. What, then, explains how within two days all major roads in Yangon had been cleared, and electricity, water and telecom services largely restored within three weeks?
Myanmar had never in recorded history faced a natural disaster of such magnitude. At a time like this, when the focus and the energy of the nation was directed towards rescue, relief and rehabilitation, the author bemoans the fact that in the official daily New Light of Myanmar, “there were, for example, no disaster pictures… the images of bereft families and broken homes.” According to her way of thinking, the government of Myanmar has failed in its duty by not showing pictures and publishing reports of the horror of death and destruction.
On the subject of relief and rehabilitation, the government was clear that it would maintain control and that aid and assistance would be accepted on its terms. No one was to be allowed to take advantage of this tragedy to portray the government as incompetent and ineffective for purposes of political propaganda, or to make attempts at regime change. Despite the Myanmar government’s stated expectation of global goodwill, the author says, “foreign governments offered aid and assistance. Astoundingly the Myanmar government turned them down.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Within a week aid and assistance started pouring in from India, China, Asean and many other countries. Fully equipped medical teams from many countries worked alongside Myanmar medical personnel in the worst-affected areas.
The author’s statement applied only to the government’s initial reaction to a select group of countries. The author herself provides the answers later in the book. The day before Cyclone Nargis, the US had imposed more sanctions on Myanmar. The US, UK and France had positioned a powerful naval force off the coast. The French foreign minister tried hard to push the concept of “responsibility to protect”. Time magazine asked, “Is it time to invade Burma?” The author says there had been considerable breakdown of law and order after the disturbances in September 2007 and adds, “they would have been especially wary of taking any steps that might compromise their control… the threat of invasion could have looked very real… under such conditions it was unlikely that the Generals would acquiesce to allowing large numbers of foreigners into the country.” Almost a month later the naval ships moved out of the Bay of Bengal and Myanmar did accept aid and assistance from these Western countries.
The author also speaks of her visit to Monsoon restaurant, where she saw “a group of Red Cross workers lingering over a lunch of many courses and UN staff clinking glasses”. While expressing apprehensions about aid being misused by the Myanmar government, the author might have done some research to see how much of every dollar that international donor agencies spent in Myanmar reached the victims of the cyclone and how much was used for the maintenance of “expert personnel”.
The author quotes extensively from reports of various agencies in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. “The UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that thousands more could die, if assessments were not carried out that would enable the UN to respond effectively. A report from the WHO warned of cholera and typhoid. UNICEF stated that 20% of children already had diarrhea. The FAO stated that Myanmar could face a food crisis since the delta area was the rice bowl of Myanmar. The Chief Executive of World Vision told the press: ‘We are on the cusp of a second wave of tragedy. It’s a race against time.’”
Having quoted these reports, the author makes no mention that the handling of the situation by the Myanmar government ensured that there were no epidemics, no starvation, no second wave of tragedy and no shortage of rice at the time and during the following season.
Six months after Nargis, belying the doomsday predictions of Western critics, the situation continued to improve. The author, like some critics, finds this unacceptable. “I did not share the optimism I read about in some of the international news stories, written to pass the marking of six months since Cyclone Nargis. Headlines like ‘Hope returns to the Delta’ seemed trite especially when everything I saw was the exact opposite.” The author was also not willing to accept the FAO’s statement that 97 per cent of paddy fields had been restored. When aid workers spoke to the foreign press about a new and improved relationship with the government, the author’s comment is that “it was true that access had become possible in the delta, but assistance in other areas of the country was still subject to restrictions”.
The author mentions dropping in on an emergency shelter cluster meeting attended by a Deputy Director from the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement. She makes it a point to describe the end of the meeting when the Deputy Director, leaving in a hurry, is “swinging his briefcase maniacally… [A]s I watched him rush away, I noticed that the briefcase looked incredibly light and wondered idly if it might actually be empty”. This is needless criticism in poor taste of a junior government servant but more to the point it reflects deep prejudice and the totality of the book — idle musings, empty of substance.
The reviewer was Ambassador to Burma from 2005 to 2008
EVERYTHING IS BROKEN
Author: Emma Larkin
Publisher: Penguin
Pages: 272
Price: Rs 599