CCP Meet: Big Hu, Small Hu and the who's who

Here's what we have learnt about China's emerging trajectory and ideology under Xi Jinping from observing the events before and after the Party Congress

China’s 20th Party Congress, which concluded on October 23, held a long mirror to China’s opaque politics. The Congress was, indeed, a festschrift to President Xi Jinping, delivered by Mr Xi himself. 

Besides, it introduced the leaders of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PBSC), China’s most powerful body, who entered the Great Hall of the People in descending order of rank. Xi entered first, re-affirming his historic third term and his status as more primus than primus inter pares. Li Qiang (63), the party secretary of Shanghai (previously governor of prosperous Zhejiang province), emerged next in the line, as China’s No 2, likely to take over as premier in 2023.

The rest of the seven-member body and beneath it, the 24-member Politburo and the 205-member Central Committee attest to a Congress that was of, by and for Xi.

However, what happened before and after the Congress helps understand the emerging trajectory and ideology of a China under Xi, euphemistically called “Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics in a ‘new era’”. The Congress announced the amendment of its charter, incorporating “two establishments”: One, re-establishing Xi’s “core” status in the party, and two, establishing “Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a ‘new era’” as a guideline — a rare political triumph for Xi.

Common prosperity and security: The two key words of the Congress are “Common Prosperity” (likely to be tabled with comprehensive tax reforms in the Third Plenum of the Congress, 2023, which focuses on the economy) and “Security”, a word mentioned 91 times in the course of Xi’s 105-minute speech. Incidentally, China’s budget for internal security is greater than its military budget.

The context to “common prosperity” is China’s slowing economy, with the International Monetary Fund predicting a 3.3 per cent growth, lower than the target of 5.5 per cent for 2022; official figures from China say that the economy grew 3.9 per cent in the July-September quarter. The property sector is under stress, there is unemployment and fractured supply-chain due to zero-Covid policy.

As for security, China continues to be dogged by geo-political and internal tensions. Rumours of a coup circulated in the Indian media in September, coinciding with the arrest of China’s ex-justice minister and three provincial police chiefs. Days before the Congress, protestors at Beijing’s Sitong Bridge unfurled a flag that said: “We don’t want PCR tests, we want to eat”. China, the first country to get into Covid-19, will be the last country to get out of Covid-19; even the people are tiring of the novelty of free PCR tests.

Inner party politics: China’s Congress unwittingly shed light on inner party politics. Ex-president Hu Jintao (2002-2012) seated next to President Xi was whisked away, forcibly it seems, based on the video that has gone viral. China’s state media said Hu left prematurely as he was feeling poorly (but not poorly enough not to pat protégé premier Li Keqiang (67) on his way out). Cyber censors have blocked mention of Hu on the internet.

Nicknamed “Big Hu”, Hu hails from the Communist Youth League (CYL). Big Hu was handpicked and “trained” in advance for the top job (which he took in 2002). Top leaders are expected to be “trained” in advance.

Xi’s leadership reshuffle left out two important “trainees” — long-time trainee vice-premier Hu Chunhua (also called “Small Hu”, 59, a protégé of Hu Jintao) who was demoted without a seat in the 24-member Politburo. Including Small Hu would have signalled factional unity. Small Hu also hailed from a CYL background.

Sun Zhengcai (59) had also been hand-picked as the “next-gen” leader along with Small Hu; in 2018, Sun was sentenced to life imprisonment on grounds of corruption.

Premier Li Keqiang  and Wang Yang (67) also from CYL were dropped in the reshuffle. China’s informal retirement age is 68. But Xi is 69.

End of collective leadership: The current PBSC stacked with loyalists has brought an end to the balance of power and system of checks and balances.

Plum posts have gone to Xi loyalists — hand-picked subordinates from Fujian and Zhejiang and from Shaanxi (Xi’s hometown). In fact, the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia (72) from Shaanxi, is said to be the kingmaker.

China’s No 2, Li Qiang hails from Wenzhou, Zhejiang. Though widely credited for Zhejiang’s “double eight” strategy (eight  strategic advantages harnessed with eight strategic actions), Li Qiang has received flak for Shanghai’s haphazard lockdown. A haunting video of the lockdown, Voices of April, went viral and social media posts scorned Li Qiang’s government. Li Qiang has not been trained on the job, as previous premiers have been, by serving as the vice-premier.

China’s 24-member Politburo includes the crème de la crème from China’s premier Tsinghua University and a rich array of professions — from scientist and physicist to economist, aeronautical engineer and environmental engineer.

New era’s new political normal: Xi has re-written the party norms/precedents put in place by China’s revered post-reform moderniser Deng Xiaoping. Stretching or selectively interpreting the retirement age, doing away with straw polls to elect members of the Central Committee, fusion of the party and the state, loyalty trumping collective leadership and consensus-based leadership, and doing away with prior selection of “next-gen” leaders are breaks from the past.

Xi has rationalised it with pronouncements like “the party is the people, the people are the party” and “China needs the world, the world needs China”. Xi’s logic is infallible — China is in a “new era” with shifts in the world and domestic order — but with “Xi Jinping Thought” as a guideline, China is in safe hands.

The writer is a Singapore-based independent Sinologist, author of Finding India in China