Devangshu Datta: Politics of vikas

In the general elections of 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s vote-share rose by over 12 per cent. It went to 31 per cent, up from 18.8 per cent in 2009. The numbers are not directly comparable due to differences in alliances and seats contested. But it's clear there was a large increase.

Many voters endorsed the lotus out of economic considerations. Vikas was the BJP's trump card. In a campaign that rewrote the textbook on Indian political campaigns, Narendra Modi successfully branded himself as a dynamic reformer who could deliver good times. This contrasted favourably with the image of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which had deteriorated to the point where it looked like a coalition of tired, corrupt time-servers.

The Modi marketing campaign was backed by his track record as chief minister of Gujarat and that track record also ensured a large war chest. The spectacular heli-borne, hologram-driven rallies cost a bomb and India Inc paid up happily.

Many BJP voters were not too concerned, one way or another, with the social agenda of Hindutva. So long as their economic aspirations were met, Hindutva was fine. The economics were high priority in April-May 2014 and the economics remain high priority, now. If somebody offers a better economic deal, this sort of voter could switch.

The BJP also retained its core base, of course. That is the voter committed to Hindutva, who will prioritise Hindutva over vikas (and all else). This voter implicitly believes that, once Hindutva is implemented, he or she will receive a larger slice of all the pies, via membership of the majority community.

Hindutva plus vikas was the recipe that the BJP sold in 2014; the two are not absolutely incompatible. As many people have pointed out, soft Hindutva can be melded with vikas. Unfortunately the two do become incompatible when a third element enters the picture.

That third element is law and order. Most voters want a peaceful existence where they are free to live as they choose, without being paralysed by fear of howling mobs. Unfortunately, howling mobs are part of the Hindutva package. Rabid communalism is bad for business. Any political unrest is bad for vikas, and communal violence is among the worst forms of unrest. This is why Hindutva plus vikas has actually always been a dubious amalgam.

The BJP has not been able to deliver on the economic front as yet. Vikas cannot resonate unless it translates into large-scale employment and employment has not been generated on anything like the scale needed for acche din. The economic recovery has been slow and jobless so far.

The BJP really cannot deliver vikas without breaking the parliamentary logjam, and it must do so fast. It would be foolish to attempt labour reforms, or GST, in the latter part of a Lok Sabha term. So the BJP must try to win assembly elections in Bihar and UP, in order to beef up its Rajya Sabha numbers, if one may use a four-letter word.

If it is to win the assemblies, the BJP must retain the voters who bought the vikas story in 2014. It can try to convince them that it is still capable of delivering vikas, despite the efflux of time, and accumulation of evidence to the contrary. Or, it can try and convert them into votaries of Hindutva.

A polarised electorate may be more willing to vote for Hindutva without vikas. On the other hand, pushing a communal agenda may also drive away some voters, who prioritise vikas. That's a gamble and it's hard to assess the likely conversion rate, if one might use another dirty word.

The BJP is now at a crossroad in terms of future campaign strategy. Does it tell voters that it can deliver on vikas, which means reining in howling lynch-mobs? Or, does it tell voters it will opt for Hindutva, regardless of vikas? The recent incidents in Dadri and Azamgarh suggest the likely trajectory. If this is a miscalculation, India can say hello to riots and goodbye to reforms.

Twitter: @devangshudatta