- Mr Modi, though a colossus in his own right, is no Indira Gandhi. Or, the other way of seeing it: The Indian voter has matured from the Indira era. She makes a clear distinction between voting choices for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha.
Just like Indira, therefore, Mr Modi can still swing a “lamp-post” election (where a leader can get people to vote for even a lamp-post on his ticket), but only for the Lok Sabha, when seeking votes for himself. Unlike Indira, he cannot repeat the same magic for assemblies. Maharashtra is a slightly complicated case and we will return to it. Think Haryana. Within five months of the Lok Sabha elections, the party’s vote share fell by a neat 22 percentage points, to 36 per cent from 58, leaving it well short of a majority instead of the widely predicted near clean-sweep. This, in a state with a deep military and nationalist tradition, an insignificant minority vote, and 11 weeks after the action on Article 370.
Now, check the data backwards. Even after the sweep of 2014, Mr Modi wasn’t often able to sweep a state except Uttar Pradesh in 2017 and smaller states such as Haryana, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Assam. But there also was the debacle of Delhi in 2015 first, and Punjab subsequently. Gujarat (2017), which he should have won en passant, became a near-thing and stretched him fully. In Karnataka, despite the anti-incumbency factor against the Congress and the embarrassing compromises it made with the Ballary brothers, the BJP finished well short. Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh were lost later.
- The most important takeaway is that, unlike in the Indira era, when one-party domination was accepted as a given, India has evolved into a much more federal nation. If the voter makes a clear distinction between choices made for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha, it emboldens those who can hold their own, even if they aren’t too hostile to the BJP, like Naveen Patnaik, K Chandrashekar Rao, Y S Jagan Mohan Reddy and, going ahead, probably the DMK.
- Here is why even the count of 17 states currently under the BJP, as the graphic shows, is a half-truth. Some of these, notably Bihar and Haryana, are in partnership with allies who might have a radically different ideological view and vested interests. Some, like Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Manipur, are essentially the political equivalent of leveraged buyouts. So, they aren’t particularly BJP states. Sikkim, Mizoram are part of the NDA, but not the BJP’s. The other, even less convenient unstated half of this truth is that today the BJP owns only three major states: Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Karnataka. The last one is fragile.
- Since the rise of the Modi-Shah paradigm, the BJP has followed a simple formula. Sweep the Hindi heartland and the two big western states, and you can rule India with a majority by just adding some little bits on the platter from here and there.
- Take a close look at Maharashtra. Why the Nationalist Congress Party and the Congress went with the Shiv Sena has a simpler explanation: They were fighting for survival and power, if undeserved. But why did the Shiv Sena break away? It was because they saw in the relentless expansion of the BJP in their state a rapid erosion of their own ideological space. Their rebellion is a straightforward immune reaction to single-party domination, even if it is like-minded.
- The Centre-state equation is more likely to return closer to the 25-year epoch of 1989-2014 now. The noises from Maharashtra are disconcerting: Opposition to bullet train, silly threats on the metro. Andhra has already delivered a nasty blow to India’s FDI-friendly claims by peremptorily throwing out Amaravati and reputed foreign partners, from Singapore to the Gulf’s LuLu Group. The prime minister will have to reach out and hug these chief ministers too, as he does his foreign counterparts.
- And the biggest issue of them all: The National Register of Citizens, or NRC. Ms Banerjee might have been the first to reject it formally, but it is unlikely that most of the non-BJP governments would now fall in line with an idea so divisive, so dangerous, and loaded against them.
- And finally, in case you think I am counting only the downsides for the BJP. See that graphic again, with shrinking swathes of saffron. That is a limited electoral reality. Check out the ideological/philosophical picture. In all of India, you do not find one chief minister who, forget opposing, doesn’t instead welcome the blunting of Article 370 and the Supreme Court judgment on Ayodhya.
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