Since the middle of last week, the spectacular bonfire of FTX, a crypto exchange, has kept us enthralled. FTX, which was valued at $32 billion a few months ago and funded by the finest names of the global financial markets such as Sequoia, Temasek, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, SoftBank Group Corp, and hedge funds Third Point and Tiger Global, suddenly declared bankruptcy on November 11. Since then, bizarre stories of worthless tokens shown as assets, the sudden withdrawal of billions of dollars of cash before bankruptcy, the fake altruistic halo of the frizzy-haired boy-wonder founder Sam Bankman-Fried, known as SBF, and complete lack of controls, checks, and balances at FTX have stunned the world. What are the lessons from this saga of gigantic fraud? FTX could not have grown to this size and flamed out had two of the most important players in the system — institutional investors and regulators — not drifted from first principles. What are these first principles?
First principles of investing: As Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Zweig writes: “SBF may be at the center of what went wrong, but he didn’t act alone. Behind him lies a vast ecosystem of fantasy and fakery. It’s called the investing business.” In the case of FTX, the finest investors failed to do due diligence on the operation that FTX was running. John Ray III, who has been appointed chief executive officer (CEO) of FTX by the debtors after it filed for bankruptcy, scathingly says: “I have over 40 years of legal and restructuring experience. I have been the chief restructuring officer or CEO in several of the largest corporate failures in history. I have supervised situations involving allegations of criminal activity and malfeasance … Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here. From compromised systems integrity and faulty regulatory oversight abroad, to the concentration of control in the hands of a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals, this situation is unprecedented.” This ought to have been obvious to investors. There were plenty of red flags.
* FTX’s board had only three directors earlier this year: SBF, an FTX employee, and an Antigua lawyer who specialises in gaming.
* During a Zoom interview to raise money from Sequoia Capital, SBF was surreptitiously playing a videogame, which was a bragging point in profile on him, commissioned by Sequoia.
* The audit firm of FTX.com and similar exchanges in non-US jurisdictions was Prager Metis, whose website claims it is the “first-ever CPA (certified public accountant) firm to officially open its Metaverse headquarters in the metaverse platform Decentraland”.
* SBF controlled Alameda Research LLC, which was a “crypto hedge fund” applying strategies such as arbitrage, market making, yield farming, and trading volatility. It also offered over-the-counter trading services, and made other debt and equity investments. SBF owned 90 per cent and Gary Wang (10 per cent) in the company. Alameda prepared consolidated financial statements on a quarterly basis but it appears that none of these financial statements has been audited. The September 30, 2022, balance sheet shows $13.46 billion in total assets, which were mostly in useless tokens issued by FTX.