The Political Thought of Xi Jinping: Party's history beyond question

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF XI JINPING

by Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung

Oxford University Press

296 pages  ₹995

  Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) there have been efforts by every leader to leave an indelible mark on the history of the party, Chinese politics and society. Since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, no one has come close to achieving this feat — but Xi Jinping is definitely serious about being the next one to do so.

 

The primary goal of Xi Jinping Thought is to make China great again and is driven by the agenda that the ultimate goal is “… to create “one state, one people, one ideology, one party, and one leader”. The book argues that “Xi intends his Thought to guide the Party in steering the country”. Thus, for anyone wishing to understand China, a deeper and nuanced study of the Xi Jinping Thought is essential.

 

Xi introduced the “Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, which was added to the CCP’s Constitution. With the abolition of the term limit on the presidency and no successor in sight, Xi is poised to rule for life with no major challenges to his “idea of China”. 

 

With Xi Thought, the president is attempting to mould Chinese society and politics. The agenda, however, is clear to him and him only. And because this agenda has strong global implications there is an urgent need to decode his thinking. This is the task Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung attempt in The Political Thought of Xi Jinping.  The authors contextualise Xi Jinping Thought, its shortcomings and strengths and where it may be directed.  Given the unprecedented changes underway in China, the book could not have been written at a more opportune time.

 

What Xi has achieved primarily is “pushed through structural and ideological changes to strengthen the Party’s leadership over the state” and move towards a more Leninist party structure. In China, however, the party was always more powerful than the state; Xi is merely intensifying this power paradigm. The sanctity of ideology is critical for him as he reiterates that “the Party is a communist party not only in name but also in reality,” marking a clear shift from Deng Xiaoping’s justifications for economic reform and liberalisation.

 

There is also an attempt to sanctify and rebuild the historical narrative. Xi has consistently underscored his love of Chinese history. Thus, the push to make China great again is a nostalgic and nationalistic notion rooted in Xi’s “Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”. He has strategically weaponised the idea of history by introducing the concept of “historical nihilism”, which makes it almost blasphemy for anyone to contradict and challenge the idea of history promoted by the Party.

 

Xi Thought also focuses on the Chinese people and their role is defined under the concept of “arming the brain”. This basically implies that, “loving the Party and the nation are the same thing, and something that any hot-blooded Chinese patriot must do”. He also asserts that scientists need to be patriots first and scientists second. To push the Party narrative and suppress dissent, there has been an intensification of high-tech mass surveillance of the Chinese people. Under Xi, the Party demands from its citizens an active defence  of the regime’s security and an acceptance of more intrusive party control over their lives. He is also grooming the education system to strengthen the “bond between the students and the party-state”. The authors argue that Xi has modified the social contract and it applies to when the Chinese citizens have been re-educated to become “patriotic Chinese”. Thus, loyalty to the party is non-negotiable.

 

That is why he sees economic growth as crucial because “he cannot afford to let the economy perform too poorly lest the people turn against the Party”. Even the long-lasting anti-corruption drive was rooted in mitigating anti-party sentiments seeping into society and the party. Xi deeply believes the party and he are almost intertwined, one cannot respect one and ignore the other. The authors conclude that “for all intents and purposes [Xi Jinping Thought] is already being treated as a proto-ideology and gives a broad-brush but clear outline of where Xi aims to take China until 2050 or at least while he stays in power”.

 

The authors have successfully painted a picture of what China looks like under Xi and how it is different from earlier regimes. A nuanced reading also helps one understand the insecurities and challenges that Xi faces and how these weaknesses may impact him. But one cannot ignore the idea that Xi Thought is situated in Xi himself and he is the core of this narrative. Under Xi Thought, China can follow only one way: “the Xi way”.

 

 

The reviewer is Associate Professor, OP Jindal Global University