Hurricane Melissa was ravaging the West Indian island of Jamaica the day Arunabha Ghosh, founder and chief executive officer of Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), a Delhi-based think tank, spoke to S Dinakar over video. Ghosh is also a special envoy for South Asian nations at the Conference of Parties (COP 30), a UN-led global climate summit in Belém, Brazil. He referred to Melissa to underscore the urgency of finding success at the latest COP, beginning 10 November, and why implementation is key to climate mitigation, and what the COP process can do to help South Asian nations combat global warming. Edited excerpts:
You are representing South Asian nations at COP 30. What exactly will your role be?
Yes, I have been appointed as the special envoy of the COP presidency representing South Asia. It’s not a negotiating role. Each country will have its own delegation for that. My task is to ensure that the voices, needs, and innovations from the region are reflected in the international discourse. It’s also about finding areas of convergence for regional action and conveying perspectives both within and across regions. In essence, I serve as a bridge between the presidency and South Asia.
Do you see any convergence of climate issues across South Asia, given the diversity of countries?
South Asia is geographically diverse; we have small island states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, mountainous countries like Nepal and Bhutan, and highly stressed coastal regions in Bangladesh and parts of India. Despite these differences, several common threads emerge.
Across my consultations, countries emphasised that this is a time to step forward, not back, on climate action. There’s growing interest in exploring regional cooperation in mitigation, resilience, and investment. Ideas included aggregating NDCs (nationally determined contributions or climate pledges) to create larger investment markets, setting up regional climate dashboards, and establishing regional finance facilities for resilience.
Given the political shifts in the region, from India’s tensions with Pakistan to leadership changes in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, do you think South Asia can present a united front at COP, or will countries act individually?
I didn’t speak with anyone from Pakistan, but I did engage with the other countries. Despite geopolitical challenges, climate action could become a unifying platform for collaboration.
While internal political developments are their own affairs, there’s a shared recognition of South Asia’s extreme climate vulnerability. Each country will participate through its respective negotiating blocs, which may overlap or differ based on priorities. However, I found a clear expectation of Indian leadership. Countries are looking to India’s energy transition experience for lessons, while also sharing their own best practices. Many of these ideas for regional cooperation can also move forward outside of the COP process.
Do you think the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and COP 30 will impact negotiations or financing?
So far, no other country has indicated an intention to withdraw, which shows continued faith in the multilateral process. However, we should not rely solely on multilateralism. Strategic bilateralism or ‘coalitions of the doing’ partnerships that deliver tangible results will be key.
Regarding climate financing, the $300 billion figure announced at COP 29 in Baku last year lacked clarity. Does it include adaptation and resilience funding? Do you have a view on what the fair balance should be between grants, loans, and private finance?
The $300 billion includes both mitigation and adaptation, but historically, most of it has gone to mitigation. Between 2018 and 2022, only about 26 per cent of public climate finance was in the form of grants. We need to increase both the grant component and the share of adaptation finance. The ‘Baku to Belém’ roadmap expected next week will outline how to scale from $300 billion to $1.3 trillion through a mix of public and private capital.
At CEEW, we have proposed that major historical emitters contribute 0.08 per cent of their GDP toward the Loss and Damage Fund, which could mobilise around $60 billion annually, which is far higher than the $800 million pledged so far. This would demonstrate genuine global solidarity.
How should that $1.3 trillion be distributed? Is there any formula?
Not yet. I’m not involved in drafting the roadmap, so I can’t comment on allocation criteria. Ideally, countries should prioritise both vulnerable regions for resilience and high-potential areas for clean energy. NDCs should form the foundation for determining priorities. Around 73 per cent of new NDCs now reference adaptation, which is encouraging.
Why have so many countries delayed their NDC submissions, including India?
You’d have to ask governments directly, but globally, countries are juggling multiple insecurities — climate, energy, and economic. Rather than focusing only on the ambition gap, we should address the implementation gap. We need to spotlight countries that are getting things done, not just making promises.
Does India’s reliance on coal undermine its credibility in global climate talks?
India currently has around 22 GW (Gigawatt) of coal-based capacity under construction, most of which was sanctioned before the pandemic. At the same time, over 50 per cent of our installed electricity capacity now comes from non-fossil sources.
Recent renewable-plus-storage auctions such as in Madhya Pradesh are delivering power below Rs 3 per unit. The economy clearly favours clean energy. From affordability, reliability, and security standpoints, clean energy is the better path for India. It’s the most sustainable way to meet growing demand while reducing import dependence and emissions.
What would you say are the top two or three priorities common to all South Asian nations at COP?
Financing for adaptation and resilience is a universal need. The global goal of adaptation must reflect countries’ unique circumstances without increasing their reporting burdens.
Implementation pathways — countries want flexibility to pursue their nationally determined strategies, consistent with the bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement.
Finance transparency — ensuring that pledged funds are actually delivered and leveraged for greater investment.
On the global stock-take, when you say it should align with NDCs, do you mean it should not impose top-down targets?
Exactly. The Paris Agreement is built on a bottom-up structure. The stock-take — a process to assess the collective progress of countries towards meeting climate goals every five years — should not become a top-down mechanism that dictates what countries must do.
Do you think the COP should be smaller, like it was when it started, where perhaps more could have been achieved?
This year, in fact, it’s a little more distributed. The Brazilian presidency is organizing a business summit in São Paulo. There’s a subnational Mayors’ Summit in Rio, and then there are the actual negotiations in Belém. So, in some ways, the folks in Belém will largely be those directly involved with negotiations.
More generally, I think the COP process has to become a bank of actions. Historically, it’s been a bank of commitments. And because those commitments don’t get met, their value gets devalued and then there’s a risk of a run on the bank.
Instead, if we shift the focus to implementation making it about submitting actions that have been conducted then the nature of the conversation changes, and so do the people at the table. It need not only be negotiators; it should include those who can deliver finance at lower costs or build infrastructure faster.