BJP's muscular approach in NE falters, but party sticks to its strategy

Manipur represents the BJP's unique ideological approach to governing Northeast by playing identity politics jiu-jitsu. It hasn't gone well yet and is getting worse, but party insists on continuing

The word “muscular” has come into prolific use over the last decade in debates about the Narendra Modi government’s policies. Is it then a strong or a weak government today? Manipur is a good place to begin.

If a Modi-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) backer, you’d call its handling of Manipur an act of strength. For its critics, it would represent its biggest failure. What if we suggested that the answer is neither of the two? And no, this isn’t one of those convenient cop-outs that say there’s some truth in either.

The answer is that Manipur represents the BJP’s unique ideological approach to governing the Northeast by playing identity politics jiu-jitsu in the region. If the unique governance challenge of the Northeastern states is small identity politics, the BJP counters with the might of the big identity. That’s why we used the example of jiu-jitsu, where you use the strength and bulk of a rival to defeat them. For the BJP, this is a work in progress. It hasn’t gone well yet, it is getting worse, but the party insists on continuing with it.

In their view, the Congress blundered all these decades on identity politics in the Northeast, especially in the tribal states. It is something I have heard from multiple (and now very senior) RSS leaders who worked in the Northeast, and from the few within the BJP  who may still be willing to engage, at least on the sidelines of action.

Briefly, it implies that the Congress never fought fire with fire. It let the tribal groups and Christian influences have too much agency of their own. It did use the sledgehammer of central power to crush insurgencies, but politically, there was “native” accommodation. And that came from the Congress party’s “flawed” understanding of Indian nationalism.

They were so committed to keeping Hinduism and the larger Hindu majority out of this expression of the national will that they left behind multiple festering wounds, and thereby “gifted” India its imperilled Northeastern frontiers.

We could simplify it further as the Congress employing small, localised identity politics to its own advantage, but only as vote banks, which left behind these problems. Diversity in sensitive border areas is cute and exotic, but it undermines the national interest as viewed from the Hindu heartland. Resolving such a chronic problem will take time, and be prepared for some setbacks along the way. Count Manipur as one, but also see “what we are doing there — fighting small identity (Kuki-Christian-Myanmarese) with larger identity (Meitei-Hindu-Indian). Everybody knows whose side we, the Centre, are on. You wanted to play identity politics? Be my guest. Then, of course, we run into some complications.

The latest being your own chief minister, a Hindu and widely hailed in whispers within the BJP circles as “Meitei logon ke toh ab woh bhagwan hain” (for the Meitei, he’s now their God), presenting a memorandum to the governor demanding control over the central forces, just after his son-in-law had sought their withdrawal. I cannot find another instance where the chief minister of the ruling party in New Delhi goes to the governor appointed by the Centre to demand control over central forces, and indirectly, their withdrawal. Read his lips. He’s saying: You want to have us fight this out as Meitei Hindus versus Kukis, leave it to us. We have the weapons, the numbers and the wherewithal, if only your central forces did not come in the way. Back to our question: Is this a strong or weak government?

It must feel really strong if  demands are rising within its own ecosystem to use Article 356 of the Constitution and dismiss Mamata Banerjee’s government in West Bengal because of the ongoing angry but peaceful protests. Its governor in West Bengal is issuing threats on camera reading off a teleprompter, primed to take over and reinstate the majesty of the Constitution. How, then, does it reconcile with its own chief minister, in a state with about 5 per cent of West Bengal’s population, going to a cowering governor in Imphal to advise him to hand over control of the central forces or withdraw them?

On Manipur, the BJP partisan’s view is that the state is under assault from foreign-infiltrated and armed (from Myanmar) Christian Kuki tribals, and the government is doing a brilliant, if thankless, job of protecting the beleaguered and mostly Hindu Meitei majority. Never mind if they outnumber the Kukis 3:1. You don’t break this valiant fightback by using Article 356. If you are a critic, you’d say it is an abject failure. The state has lapsed into armed anarchy. Okay, it was a different era technologically, but never in Kashmir, Punjab, in full-fledged insurgencies of Nagaland and Mizoram, or in the east-central Maoist zones have we ever seen 10-km range rockets and drone-launched bombs being used.

The answer you’d hear is: Look across the border. That’s where the threat is coming from, see how broken Myanmar is. But Myanmar has always been broken, especially in its vast, forested northern zones bordering India. Today, the Myanmarese army is losing control at a dramatic pace. It can’t be anybody’s case that India should send its Army across to restore order. We’ve got work to do on our side of the border.

Since the BJP’s approach to the Northeast has been driven by the engine of Hindu-ised identity and fuelled by its ideological nationalism, it can’t admit it isn’t working. The approach has, meanwhile, lit up some new fires, reopened old wounds (Manipur) and let others fester.

The first Modi government made a spectacular beginning in the Northeast by signing the “framework” agreement for a final settlement with the Naga (NSCN) rebels. Mr Modi hailed it as historic at a televised event at his residence, Naga leaders in attendance. In its 10th year, there’s been no movement. The first central interlocutor, former Intelligence Bureau special director R N Ravi, moved upwards to Raj Bhawan (now Chennai) after NSCN accused him in 2020 of “manipulating” the framework agreement. His successor, A K Mishra, also a former IB special director, is bogged down, and just this Thursday, at a large meeting held by the Nagaland government, which included civil society, tribal, and church leaders, there was a demand for the dialogue to be elevated to the ministerial or political level. The NSCN also spoke out in tandem, saying “delay will do more harm than good”.

If Nagaland has made zero progress in nine years and slipped back more than a bit, new sparks are coming up in unexpected places, mostly in response to NRC/CAA. The Khasi Students Union has just doubled down on its anti-outsider movement. Last month, the Meghalaya Assembly passed the Meghalaya Identification, Registration (Safety & Security) of Migrant Workers Amendment Bill, 2024. Inspectors will now have greater powers to identify, register and mark out workers from “outside”.

Even in Mizoram, quiet since the peace accord in 1986 and among the most peaceful and lawful zones in India, identity issues are rising again, and these are trans-border, too. Chief Minister Lalduhoma has just made a pitch for “Zo” (the generic name for the larger Mizoram tribes), reviving the demand for Greater Mizoram. Assam has just seen bloody clashes as the BJP fights identity (Bengali Muslim) with identity (Hindus).

Since 2014, the BJP has made an ideological and philosophical shift in the Centre’s approach to the region. The outcome so far looks bad in most Northeastern states, with Manipur being the starkest example. For the BJP, overall, it’s a work in progress. It is ideological, philosophical, and, of course, political.

By special arrangement with ThePrint