The ignominious end to Sheikh Hasina’s long tenure as Bangladesh’s Prime Minister has left the country’s future uncertain. And it has left India isolated in South Asia.
There can be disagreements as to why Indian policymakers chose to support Ms Hasina as fervently as they did, even after it became clear that her popularity was fast eroding. But the fact is that they did, and thereby have left Indo-Bangladesh ties in a shambles.
One national government’s apparent support for another country’s leader would be, in most cases, an error of judgement — but one that might also be relatively straightforward to correct. However, the relationship between India and Bangladesh is somewhat more complicated, given that it implicates the choices that Bangladesh’s citizens will make about their own state’s ideological direction.
When India is seen across the border as an impartial, objective neighbour that is willing to assist when necessary and requested but otherwise views Bangladesh as an equal partner, then that creates a political climate within that country in which the spirit of 1971 — cultural independence and secular nationalism — is honoured. A political environment, however, in which India is seen as a meddling threat will also be one which retreats into a more insular, religious-tinted flavour of nationalism.
There is a very real threat, therefore, that India’s obvious support for Ms Hasina’s government, even as it descended into authoritarianism, created the conditions for a political turn within Bangladesh that, in the long term, will harm that country as well as ours.
It is unfortunate, therefore, that most of the discussion about Bangladesh in this country has been far from helpful. It is good when India speaks out for persecuted people in our neighbourhood, and there is little doubt that many members of Bangladesh’s Hindu communities have been subjected to targeted attacks. But it does sound a little unprincipled when our national discourse stayed silent during a massacre of students only to erupt now.
Repairing our relationship with Bangladesh must be a priority. The transition government must be encouraged and supported to restore order in the country, and the next election must be free and fair in a way that the last two were not. It may be hard for New Delhi to make this argument, given that it had nothing to say about the unfairness of the last few elections, but nevertheless it must. Of course, the next election should also be sufficiently in the future for the transition government to repair Bangladeshi institutions, and to ensure that the Awami League, or any successor party that retains the traditions and ideology of the League, can participate and fairly test its true electoral strength.
Rationally, there should be a post-mortem in our country about what has gone wrong with our policy. Did our decision-makers not see the danger signals? What was their Plan B? Did they maintain links with the Bangladeshi Opposition? Were they taken by surprise? But, instead, we seem to be intent on blaming everyone else from the United States to Pakistan’s spy agency.
This absence of rational consideration is not, at this point, entirely surprising. Over the past few years, governments from the Maldives to Nepal have benefited domestically from anti-Indian pitches. We have not been able to manage this political turmoil effectively: Our intervention has been heavy-handed when it occurs, we pick favourites too obviously and in a manner that discredits them, and our jingoistic media narrative outrages public opinion in our neighbours. Even on occasions where we eventually do the right thing — such as in financial support for Sri Lanka during its economic crisis — we take too long, are too parsimonious, and nudge the other side to kowtow so much that we breed resentment rather than gratitude.
Nor has our economic heft been exploited to truly benefit our neighbourhood relations. Economic integration with Bangladesh has not proceeded as swiftly as it should have. Our support for Indian companies in some other neighbours has sometimes proved controversial. And the delivery of promised projects is slow and can be seen as permissive of local corruption.
With the possible exception of Bhutan, India is relatively friendless in South Asia at the moment. Does that matter? Perhaps not, given our sheer size. But perhaps it does, as well. Few countries are able to focus on growth and development when their entire neighbourhood is unfriendly. Who will be held accountable for this failure?