The failed Marshal Doctrine: Pak's most 'creative' military dictatorship

Twentieth century onwards, the world has seen numerous uniformed dictators. No country, however, has produced as much innovation in military rule as Pakistan.

 

The latest, now that the notification anointing Asim Munir Army Chief and Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) for five years has been issued, is the most breathtaking. Any Pakistani cadet who steps into the academy can aspire to become the country’s ruler. Yet, Gen Munir has now pulled a stunning innovation, incredible even by Pakistan Army’s standards.

 

See it this way. None of Pakistan’s 23 Prime Ministers in 75 years (Liaquat Ali Khan was the first in 1950) has completed a five-year term because the army wouldn’t let them. And yet Gen Munir has got his current prime minister to appoint him CDF for five years.

 

It isn’t an irony or absurdity to laugh at. This is a military dictatorship’s innovation equivalent to the best that Tesla or Palantir might achieve in tech domains. First, Gen Munir persuaded the Sharifs to appoint him chief a day before his retirement, while the incumbent (Qamar Javed Bajwa) was still in service. As a result, Pakistan had two serving chiefs for two days. Now, his three-year tenure ended on November 28, so he retired that day, but continued to be chief nevertheless for almost a week when the notification appointing him CDF and army chief was issued. I presume it is retrospective;  otherwise some auditor might object to his salary for the days in between when he had no job. Of course, it will be a recklessly cheeky auditor.

 

Please stay with me. He first rigged the 2024 election by jailing Imran Khan and his wife, barring his party from contesting and then installing Shehbaz Sharif as Prime Minister of his choice. Now, he got the same Prime Minister to first promote him to field marshal, then mutilate his republic’s Constitution through the 27th amendment, making the field marshal’s job for life, creating the CDF as the boss of all armed forces with a five-year tenure, and lifelong immunity from prosecution. A two-year extension was thrown as a bone to the air chief, already serving an extended term since March 2024.

 

To summarise: The general became field marshal for life with immunity, then CDF for five years after the completion of his three-year tenure as chief—all through an elected Prime Minister, Parliament, the Constitution, amended by members elected in an opposition-free election. The latest in Pakistan’s history of military dictators is consecrated by its Constitution, Parliament, and notified by its Prime Minister and President. This is like the two men elected to the country’s topmost positions signing political death warrants for themselves.

 

This, the civilian government inviting the general into power isn’t unprecedented in Pakistan. In 1958, civilian President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law, appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as his Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Now Ayub fired Mirza, became President and appointed a nondescript, non-threatening general Mohammed Musa Khan as army chief under him. But how could a general report to him, also a general? He promoted himself to field marshal. Moosa lasted until 1966. This also set off the process of Pakistani army chiefs having long tenures. For comparison, Pakistan has had only 17 army chiefs, while India is already on its 31st. By the time Gen Munir finishes his term in 2030, India will have its 33rd.

 

Ayub invented party-less, “guided democracy,” held a sham election and even ensured the defeat of Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s sister Fatima. He handed over to General Yahya Khan. Yahya’s hybrid regime included Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as foreign minister. He held an election too, but when the “wrong” side, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won, tossed away the results. After him, Bhutto experimented with martial law briefly in 1977 but General Zia ousted and jailed, and later executed him. Zia, subsequently tried ushering in an Islamic regime (Nizam-e-Mustafa), followed by a party with limited democracy through a staged election, and then fired the Prime Minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, so elected. History was denied of more “imaginative;” ideas from him with that C-130 crash or bombing in Bahawalpur, August 17, 1988.

 

Since then, either a general has been directly in charge (Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2007) or controlling power from outside, or rather leading from behind, routinely cadging extensions. Until Gen Munir came with a new, improved script.

 

We avoid going into greater details of the many colourful arrangements in Pakistan and take this argument to the larger subcontinent. That far from inspiring other military strongmen in the subcontinent, the Pakistani example has persuaded them to go the opposite way. As we now see, all have eschewed political power and backed their democracy. We are talking about Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives. Even in Bhutan, the monarch has brought in a fairly elected government and ceded significant power to his elected Prime Minister. They’ve all rejected the example of Pakistan.

 

They are all safer, more stable, and already more prosperous per capita — twice as much in Bangladesh, two and a half times in Bhutan, three times in Sri Lanka, and eight times in the Maldives — compared with Pakistan.

 

Even Nepal has caught up and will soon leave Pakistan behind, given its slightly higher gross domestic product growth rate and much lower birth rates. Pakistan is the champion loser in the subcontinent because competitive politics, democracy, however messy, yields better outcomes than dimwit military dictators.

 

In each country, generals had their opportunities. In Bangladesh, two generals did rule. But the circumstances and context of General Ziaur Rahman’s takeover in 1977 were unique. It was rooted in the contested history of the Bangladesh liberation war. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was imprisoned in West Pakistan, Zia, then a major, led the rebellion along with fellow young Bengali officers on the night of the Pakistani crackdown (Operation Searchlight), March 25, 1971, shooting his East Bengal Regiment’s Punjabi commandant Lt/Col Abdur Rashid Janjua. He believed he proclaimed the new republic in a wireless radio broadcast at 7.45 PM, March 27, way earlier than Mujib. Mujib, had just been arrested and taken to West Pakistan.

 

Mujib too took a dictatorial turn and his assassination and multi-stage military takeover was led by relatively young officers. Zia, now chief, took over in 1977 and was assassinated by young officers in 1981.  After a brief civilian interregnum General H M Ershad ruled (1983-90) but ultimately democratic pushback destroyed him. All major parties, notably arch rivals Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, joined hands to oust him and restore democracy. Convicted for corruption, he did jail time. Bangladesh recovered from these hard knocks and its army, having learnt its lessons, became a guardian of democracy.

 

Over the past two years, we have seen street protests throw out deeply unpopular and elected governments in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. In each, a general could have easily taken over. Instead, they all employed the army to bring reassurance amid chaos, while supporting peaceful civilian transition and elections. In Bangladesh, the country most likely to be influenced by the Pakistani military, the most political statement you’ve heard from its chief is a gentle nudge once that elections should be held sooner rather than later.

 

That’s the three-example rule in journalism. In the exact period that Gen Munir has been consolidating power, his counterparts in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal have eschewed it with  remarkable dignity and professionalism. Each of these countries is doing better than Pakistan. And if your country is doing so much better, so what nobody (not even I, who should) can remember the name of its army chief? The downside is, Donald Trump wouldn’t hail your chief as his favourite field marshal. Isn’t that something to celebrate?

 

By special arrangement with The Print