So, for Indian industry to get much more serious about R&D, we must be present in more technology-intensive sectors, invest closer to the world average within the sectors where we are already present, and see the emergence of some giant investors in R&D among our most profitable firms. The wide availability of technical talent in India means we can use this key resource to build long-term success — if we choose to.
This discussion has placed industry at the centre of our national innovation system. I would indeed propose that any vibrant national innovation system begins with firm competitiveness. That is why India’s attempts to build technical capability through heavy investments in public R&D well ahead of most developing countries in the 1950s, 60s and 70s came to nought. There is much we can learn from the experience of the most successful economic development stories of the last 70 years — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China. Each followed a particular sequence in building innovation capacity. Firms first entered export markets as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) supplying to foreign brands. This ensured world-scale capacity and was by definition internationally competitive. These industries were usually labour-intensive and low-technology — garments, footwear, food processing. The next step was a move up the value chain to more technology-intensive sectors — consumer durables, electronic assembly, automobiles and parts, and chemical intermediates. As firms entered these sectors, they also started to invest in in-house R&D to sustain competitiveness in the long run. A later move to higher-technology sectors — semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, computers — went with increasing investments in in-house R&D. The growth of industrial R&D demanded more sophisticated research talent. Whether by design or happy accident, all five East Asian governments responded by growing their investments in publicly funded R&D and, crucially, followed the successful example of the West in locating this public research in the higher education system. The net effect was that this public research was fruitful, not because it was of much value in itself, but because excellent researchers got trained in the education system as a by-product. These researchers became the core of the increasingly sophisticated in-house R&D departments of local firms. This sequence of a competitive industry followed by deepening technical sophistication followed by in-house R&D followed by public research is my reading of the economic history of these countries. I’ve painted it broad-brush, drawing on what another pioneering economist of innovation, Keith Pavitt, argued some decades ago — albeit with the nuance of a good academic.