Why India should remain in the BRICS

It has been argued in this newspaper that India should quit the BRICS, the organisation of emerging economies that has been recently expanded (Business Standard, 8 September 2023, Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman). There is an alternative perspective which suggests that India should not only stay in the grouping but enhance its role. 
 

It is true that many of the members of the BRICS, both existing and incoming, do not pass the test of economic vibrancy, a consideration that shaped the launch of the original BRIC platform. However, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and the UAE  are not exactly a collective of ‘fading stars’ either, as Subramanian and Felman suggest. There are four good reasons why India should remain in the forum. 
 

One, China will undoubtedly seek to dominate the expanded BRICS and use it as an instrument to advance its strategic agenda. Does it make sense for India to vacate the space and give China a free run to pursue its geopolitical goals? In his remarks at 14th and 15th summit meetings of the BRICS, President Xi Jinping launched into barely-veiled attacks on the US-led West.  However, the Johannesburg II Declaration emerging out of the last summit does not contain any reference to Chinese projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Security Initiative or reflect any anti-West bias.

That is because all decisions are taken in the BRICS on the basis of consensus (thereby giving India a virtual veto). Moreover, most of the members of the expanded grouping, with the exception of Russia and Iran, are not inclined to side with China in its strategic rivalry with the US. By being inside the tent, India will be in a position to shape the future directions of the grouping, including on the issue of its further expansion. The fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are joining the BRICS but have also signed on to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor illustrates how various countries are pursuing multiple engagements.
 

Two, as a member of the BRICS, India will be in a position to maintain the focus of the grouping on economic and developmental issues, rather than letting China give it an overtly political character. 
 

A limited organisation so far, its main achievements have been in the economic domain, including the New Development Bank (proposed by India though headquartered at Shanghai) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. By being an active stakeholder in these entities, India has been able to ensure that neither is dominated by China nor exploited by it to service its pet initiatives like the BRI. 
 

The NDB in particular is professionally run and India has been a major beneficiary of its loans. Looking ahead, it should be India’s priority to maintain the focus on economic and developmental issues and use the BRICS as a vehicle for promoting its own engagement with the Global South. 
 

We should be able to discourage half-baked ideas like the BRICS currency or letting the grouping be hijacked to promote the Chinese yuan at the expense of the US dollar.  Alternative payment mechanisms can be explored bilaterally but not under the aegis of the BRICS. By not being present in the organisation, we will be giving China a free pass on these issues. 
 

Thirdly, while the BRICS is not comparable to the G20, it is still seen as an attractive forum as more than forty countries have shown interest in joining the group. This is reflective of the fact that multilateral  organisations like the United Nations have 

lost their lustre. 
 

Despite its modest achievements, BRICS has its utility and there is no compulsion for India to make a choice between the 

BRICS and the G20. Indeed, India’s proactive involvement with both will be in keeping with its policy 

of multi-engagement and strategic autonomy. 
 

Fourthly, if we can work closely with ‘autocratic’ countries in the G20, there is no reason why we can’t do likewise in the BRICS. It is difficult to see how the consideration of global governance militates against pursuing our interests in an organisation where we are a founder member. 
 

In conclusion, there is a strong case for our enhanced engagement with the BRICS rather than quitting the grouping, even while we recognise its limitations. A limited BRICS, which is not dominated by China, is not a bad proposition, and it is a feasible objective, if we continue to wield our veto in decision-making and build coalitions in the organisation. 

The writer is a former Ambassador of India to China