Outreach at Hiroshima

Calibrated diplomacy stood India in good stead

India holds the presidency of two important inter-governmental forums this year — the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the much larger Group of 20 — for which the leaders’ summits are scheduled for July and September, respectively. Set against this background, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation in the outreach sessions of the 49th G7 summit in Hiroshima over May 19 to 21, was significant in terms of establishing credible positions for Asia (in the absence of China) and the Global South vis-à-vis the seven rich Western powers of the G7. Inevitably, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated the discourse — the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communique prominently reflected this concern. In this respect, India’s independent diplomatic position could well have been a major point of contention. It is notable, however, that pre-summit protests from the European Union over India’s exports of petroleum products refined from cheap Russian oil and diamond and jewellery exports from imports of Russian precious stones did not appear to figure in the formal G7-India discourse, where US President Joe Biden’s conspicuously rich praise for Mr Modi, who is scheduled to visit the US on a state visit next month, dominated the headlines.

Importantly, Mr Modi’s meeting with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reflected a skilful balancing of the contradictions of India’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion at the United Nations, and New Delhi’s stated preference for dialogue and peaceful negotiations over war. By deploring the scale of human losses and suffering and offering Ukraine humanitarian assistance, Mr Modi’s flexible position would have resonated with other countries of the Global South, which, while not necessarily supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has been discomfited by the West’s unilateral decision to impose sanctions on Moscow, causing collateral damage on developing economies. No less notable is the fact that despite the conspicuous outreach to Mr Zelenskyy, New Delhi has not extended to him an invitation to attend the G20 leaders’ summit in September, at which Russian President Vladimir Putin will be present, despite some energetic lobbying by Ukrainian diplomats. At the same time, by offering to host the next Quad summit in 2024, Mr Modi has underlined India’s commitment to the grouping, which had occasionally been in doubt.

The significance of this carefully calibrated position between competing interests and agendas cannot be overstated. Mr Modi was one of the key leaders whom Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida invited to Hiroshima to reflect with authority and legitimacy the voice of the Global South, forge a deeper understanding of this perspective better, and ensure that the G7 did not degenerate into an echo-chamber for rich countries. From the substance of India’s engagement at the G7 it is fair to say that Mr Modi reflected those concerns adequately. The 10-point action plan he presented at the G7 outreach session focused on food security and the need to remove political constraints on global fertiliser supply chains, a blunt reference to the rise in natural gas prices as a result of the West’s Russian embargo, which has raised fertiliser prices for the developed world. To be sure, there are still gaps to be covered between the interests of the rich and the developing world in climate change, for instance, where the former urgently requires a more forceful reminder of its responsibilities. All told, however, calibrated diplomacy at Hiroshima has stood India in good stead.