In modern war, stopping at the right moment matters as much as striking

The key to fighting a war successfully, or even launching it, is a clear objective. That's an entirely political call. It isn't emotional or purely military

Was India wise or hasty in accepting the Pakistani request for a ceasefire in about the 88th hour of Operation Sindoor? Should India have continued fighting, and until when? 

These questions were revived last week with the release of the comprehensive report of the high-powered group that assessed the operation for the Switzerland-based Centre for Military History and Perspective Studies (CHPM). Its findings have mostly been welcomed in India. 

This is as you’d expect, and not merely because it puts India’s aerial losses at about half of what Pakistan claims. More importantly, it says that by the time the truce was called, the Indian Air Force “managed to significantly degrade the enemy’s air defence systems, then concluded the conflict by carrying out a series of spectacular strikes against Pakistan’s principal Air Force stations. Thus, by achieving clear air superiority, India coerced Islamabad into requesting a ceasefire.” 

At another point, the report goes on to conclude : “...sufficient elements appear to indicate that by the morning of 10 May 2025, the Indian Air Force had succeeded in achieving air superiority over a significant portion of Pakistan’s airspace. This in turn enabled it to continue long range strikes against enemy infrastructure at will…” 

Not leaving anything to chance, the report concludes that at the same time, the PAF “had lost the ability to repeat the operations it had conducted so successfully on 7 May 2025, owing to the loss of its forward air-surveillance radars and the threat posed by S-400 systems to its AWACS and standoff weapons delivery platforms…” 

The findings looked fairer and more clinical than anything seen from the Western think tanks yet, because they highlighted Pakistani retaliatory successes and Indian losses on the May 6/7 night, as well as the IAF’s return to domination quickly thereafter. It also noted that even on the night of May 6/7, the PAF was not able to interrupt or deflect any Indian strikers on Bahawalpur or Muridke. In the immediate upshot, two questions emerged. 

One, from sceptics who asked: Spectacular as Indian strikes were, can you call it air superiority because the IAF was launching from deep within its own airspace? This is somewhat nerdy and, some would argue (this writer included), outdated, as almost all warfare, especially in the air, is now long-distance and you do not have to go into the adversary’s airspace or even close to it. This question is relatively esoteric. 

The second, and the larger question, is the one we raised right upfront: Did India accept the ceasefire too early? Many serious and substantive Indian voices call the ceasefire hasty, and rue that a hard-won opportunity to chasten Pakistan was sacrificed. The counter-question would be: How would then India have defined victory and when? With a total destruction of the PAF? A Dhaka, 1971 encore? India has argued since the evening of May 10 that its objectives were achieved, it owned escalation dominance and knew when to call it a day. Whether it was wise or the typically old Indian habit of leaving issues unfinished, is the debate. 

This is a question fundamental to all warfare. A war must be defined by the objectives, especially for the side that starts it. That’s the question Atal Bihari Vajpayee had asked at the peak of the full mobilisation for Operation Parakram in January 2002, when the furious national mood wanted an all-out war. Vajpayee himself had subsequently threatened “aar-paar ki ladai” (a fight to the finish). But early that January, in a conversation recorded by me multiple times while he was around, he reflected on what the name of that war would be when its history is written. 

The key to fighting a war successfully, or even launching one, is a clear objective. That’s an entirely political call. It isn’t emotional or purely military. Not knowing clear objectives, India got bogged down in Operation Parakram, fully mobilised and deployed for 10 months. Ultimately, a totally uneventful, tired thaw led to a return to barracks. Did India miss an opportunity? It’s an enduring debate. 

While the mobilisation was in its early weeks (it followed the terror attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001), General Pervez Musharraf delivered a dramatic, televised speech that sounded like an almost total capitulation. He promised to not let any Pakistani controlled territory be used for terror hereon and even said that Pakistan had not given asylum to anybody on India’s list of 22 fugitives. If we find them, we can send them back, he said. 

Could the Vajpayee government have seized that moment, declared victory and rolled back the mobilisation? I would argue that it missed that moment. Ten months dug-in on the frontlines led to unnecessary pain and loss of life (India lost nearly 800 and Pakistan about as many), only to accidents with live ammunition and minefields. The final outcome, as documented in the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks and the Islamabad Declaration (6 January 2004), was no better than what was conceded in that January 12 speech. 

There were three such decisions in our independent history, two made by us and one by an adversary. In 1999 and 1971, India set clear objectives: The clearance of all occupied Kargil territories, and the liberation of Bangladesh, respectively. Vajpayee tossed off pressures, especially from the armed forces, to expand the fighting beyond the LoC. Indira Gandhi offered an immediate ceasefire in the western sector after Pakistan’s surrender in the east. 

There is an eternal debate and regret in some circles that she did not finish the “business” in the western sector. But she was clear in her objectives and declared victory after just 13 days of fighting. The third such call was taken at our cost.  In 1962, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and returned from where they had started in the eastern sector, and in Ladakh barring some enclaves. Their objective of teaching Nehru and India a lesson was attained. They did not want to get bogged down in a never-ending war, especially when they had multiple crises at home. 

I understand that in the middle of 1962 and 1971, there was also the 1965 war, which ended with much international pressure that neither side pushed back against. Only Pakistanis, who started the war, had an objective  — taking Kashmir. They lost out and India defended more than adequately. Both were wise to accept a ceasefire. 

In conclusion, we can look back at General George S Patton’s impassioned view that the Allies should have taken the war into the Soviet Union to defeat “the Communists” rather than let them become a perpetual threat. He didn’t say so quite as dramatically as in the movie, but there are records of him pleading with the then Under-Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, on May 7 and 8, 1945. On May 18, he wrote in his diary that he could defeat the Russians “with the greatest of ease.” On May 20, he wrote to his wife making the same point. All of this is archived. 

There is good reason behind the oldest wisdom that war is too serious a business to be left to generals. Add to that social media strategists. That call is made by politicians, who look at the bigger picture. This was the case for America in 1945, China in 1962, India in 1971 and 1999. Operation Sindoor had a limited objective, destroying nine Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba centres by the IAF and Army. This done, truce was offered on May 7 morning. Because Pakistan fought on, their bases were attacked, imagery secured, and it was time to call it a day, in victory. Knowing when and how to stop fighting is as important as starting it. 

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