The items targeted by the DGTR included calcined gypsum, insoluble sulfur, untreated fumed silica, sodium hydrosulfide, 2-ethylhexanol, beta naphthol, acetone, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) paste resin, polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resin and films, viscose rayon filament (VFY) yarn, nylon filament yarn, elastomeric filament yarn, seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles of iron, alloy or non-alloy steel, flat-rolled aluminium products and so on. Almost all these items are raw materials or intermediates, so any anti-dumping duty on them can raise costs for user industries. For example, higher costs of VFY, a key input in the textile industry, are transmitted down the value chain into fabric and garments. In a sector, where margins are already thin, that matters. The same is true of the chemical and engineering sectors.
Research papers in the Indian context have clearly shown that India’s anti-dumping system has often functioned more as an industry-protection instrument than as a narrow remedy against genuinely predatory pricing, and that the trade effects are real: targeted imports usually fall, prices tend to rise, and the consumer or user industry interests are often underemphasised.
The problem is not with the legal principle. Dumping can be real, and domestic industry deserves protection where injury is established. The problem is that well-advised domestic producers can file technically robust applications and pursue them with sustained legal and procedural support. By contrast, downstream users are fragmented, less organised and often poorly represented, even though they collectively bear a large part of the economic cost.
World Trade Organisation data show that India is the highest user of anti-dumping measures. From January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2025, out of a total of 4,793 anti-dumping actions, India accounted for 854 compared to 700 by the United States, 379 by the European Union and 273 by China. In the first half of 2025 alone, India notified 31 anti-dumping actions to the WTO compared to 78 by all other countries put together.
The DGTR only examines whether there is dumping, material injury to domestic producers and a causal link between the two. Unlike earlier years, the finance ministry does not act mechanically on every DGTR recommendation, and some review of downstream impact now appears to exist. Yet 41 anti-dumping notifications were issued in 2025. That suggests the need for a stronger system to assess the impact on downstream users. It is perhaps time to consider whether such examination by an independent body should be mandatory before the government acts on the DGTR recommendations.
Anti-dumping duty is a double-edged sword. Therefore, it must be used with greater discipline. Used carelessly, it may protect one producer while imposing dispersed but substantial costs on thousands of users. Every recommendation should, therefore, be evaluated not only for injury to the petitioning industry, but also for its impact on downstream costs, user industries and consumer prices. Trade remedies must remain remedies, not become a convenient route to protectionism.
 "West Asia conflict: Anti-dumping duties need a downstream impact test")