New Bill will make tribunal appointments transparent and independent

The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, was passed by Parliament on Tuesday. The Bill’s provisions, once enacted, could have far-reaching implications for how tribunal members are appointed and beyond. Various tribunals have been established to reduce the caseload of the judiciary and to hear and adjudicate special kinds of cases. The Securities Appellate Tribunal, for instance, hears appeals against orders passed by the securities market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India. In a well-functioning market economy, it is critical that such appeals are quickly disposed of. However, if tribunals, like the broader judiciary, suffer from a shortage of human resources or lack the right kind of resources, the very purpose of having them is undermined. The Bill intends to address this shortfall. 

It envisages establishing an independent National Tribunals Commission (NTC). Courts have settled that tribunals that take up the jurisdiction of high courts must have the latter’s independence and capacity. Therefore, the body for appointments in tribunals must be dominated by the judiciary. Given that the executive is the biggest litigant, it is ill-suited to make such appointments. Thus, the Bill provides for an independent NTC. It will be created through this Act of Parliament and bound by the law. The NTC will have a chairperson who will be a retired judge of the Supreme Court or chief justice of a high court. It will also have two members who will be retired judges of high courts, along with two technical members with relevant experience. It will thus have a majority from the judiciary. The members of the commission will be appointed by the Government of India in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. 

The Bill has elaborate provisions to protect the independence of the NTC and its decision-making. Notably, the selection committee will recommend only one name for each vacancy, along with a waiting list. The reasoning is that a panel of names for a vacancy leaves the final selection in the hands of the executive and, in a way, undermines the process. There would also be strict timelines for recommendation and approval by the government. The government’s discretion in the appointment process will clearly be limited. It is to be expected that appointments to various tribunals will be made in time, which would help increase efficiency. It must also be ensured that tribunals have adequate support staff. The commission will be supported by a secretariat, which will handle the administrative part. It will, for instance, compile the vacancies in various tribunals and advertise them as provided in the regulation. It will also process applications, and the administrative ministries will not have any role in the process. The secretariat can also empanel experts for selections. 

Given the broad framework, it is to be expected that the speed and quality of appointments will improve. It is also being argued that this framework can be extended to the appointment of judges in the higher judiciary. It is fair to argue that the present collegium system is opaque and has been criticised by stakeholders. The NTC-like framework will retain the dominance of the judiciary and will have the permanent support of a secretariat, which will help build institutional memory. Recommending a single name for a position will also improve the process. The government will have to provide compelling reasons for not accepting the recommendation. The framework may have to be refined, but it is certainly worth debating.