West Asia's China syndrome

Chinese warships in the region raise threat perceptions

The discovery that six Chinese warships had been stationed at Kuwait for the past week has added a new dynamic to the Israel-Hamas war. With the navies of the world’s two most powerful nations, which are ranged on opposite sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict, present in the theatre, commentators suggest that the threat of escalation has increased significantly. China has consistently supported the Palestinian cause, and last week Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned historical injustices against Palestine in a call with his Saudi counterpart. Beijing has, however, sought to dial down threat perceptions. A Chinese defence ministry statement clarified that the 44th Naval Escort Task Force has, in fact, been in the region since May, having conducted a joint exercise with Oman. It was now on a goodwill visit to Kuwait. This development comes against the background of the Chinese foreign minister’s planned visit to Washington over October 26-28 to meet senior officials. Ahead of this visit, which includes a broader agenda of addressing Sino-US tensions, Mr Wang told his Israeli counterpart that China would do its utmost to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. These diplomatically emollient statements, when set against the background of Beijing’s success in negotiating rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in April, suggest that China is positioning itself as a credible interlocutor in the region rather than a gunboat diplomat.

This effort is not new. Chinese naval influence in the region has been entrenched for over a decade. It started in 2008 with modern China’s first naval mission abroad under the Far Seas deployment when three warships sailed to Aden as an independent counter-piracy task force at the height of the Somali piracy crisis. Since then, the Chinese have deployed 42 such anti-piracy task forces and, although outside international counter-piracy coalitions, it is said to have played a key cooperative role in deterring Somali piracy. President Xi Jinping has since upped the game, establishing a naval base in Djibouti and deploying larger attack vessels that far transcend their role as pirate chasers. US intelligence has also warned the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of a secret Chinese facility being built in the region, not far from American military bases. None of this should come as a surprise, given China’s deepening economic interests in West Asia and neighbouring Africa. As the world’s largest buyer of crude oil and other key raw materials, the region is critical to sustaining China’s economic engine. Though Russia has overtaken Saudi Arabia as China’s largest crude oil supplier since the Ukraine war started, West Asia still accounts for almost half of China’s oil purchases.

The latest development could challenge the role India has sought to play, with its unique position of having good relations with both Israel and West Asian nations. Sending humanitarian aid to Gaza has enhanced the foreign policy establishment’s stance, evident in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, of seeking peaceful resolutions to conflicts. It is possible that China has viewed with unease the prospects of an India-Middle East Corridor linking Europe and India via Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and sees the Israel-Hamas conflict as an opportunity to get ahead of the game and deepen its influence in the region. But Beijing is yet to fully reveal its playbook here, which makes waiting and watching a sensible strategic option for New Delhi.