Pages: 522; Price: Rs 695
The canvas is wide and labyrinthine. This holds a mirror to several players to say how badly we have messed it up. It also shows that there has not been a comprehensive approach to the financial sector in spite of several deeply insightful reports that the policy makers have had, starting from the Narasimham committee all the way to the P J Nayak committee. The book shows how the state has been kicking the can down the road with regard to reforming public sector banks — neither going on the autonomy route, nor moving on the disinvestment route, but repeatedly using the banking system for fiscal objectives. And reinvesting instead of disinvesting. This is why I would argue that this story should have located itself in 1994 when the policy-makers decided to make the banking system market-facing, by allowing new private banks to come up. Every time the private sector grew, the public sector instead of moving more towards markets moved towards the State. After the Narasimham committee, the only time the possibility of a structural reform arose was after the P J Nayak committee submitted its report, with Raghuram Rajan at the helm of RBI; and the National Democratic Alliance government prioritising banking reform through its Gyan Sangams and Indradhanush programmes till demonetisation hit us. That is where the dribble of the ball of political will to reform banking was passed back to the executive and the goal post was in the opposite direction. This book leaves us deeply disturbed and depressed. We knew episodically that the banking system was slipping. With every slip, there was a bit of stability at that level and before there could be scaling, there was another slip. This gives us a perspective on how all these small slippery slopes have made the banking system sink. The only hope is that this book gives a wake-up call for urgent and deep structural reforms in the financial sector. Not piecemeal but comprehensive.