The Broken China Dream: Minxin Pei's book charts Xi's inevitable rise

The author argues that Xi could dismantle Deng's "reforms" because latter was not totally committed to political reform and was against a third-party check on future establishment of personality cults

The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism

by Minxin Pei

Published by 

Princeton University Press

344 pages  $29.95

  Minxin Pei’s book The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism is a detailed account of how the limitations of the neo-authoritarian policies established under Deng Xiaoping provided an easy platform for Xi Jinping to reestablish neo-Stalinist rule. In Pei’s words, “Xi, a dogmatic Leninist, is the opposite of Deng, who was a pragmatic Leninist” but there are multiple similarities too — “a strong antipathy to liberal democracy, [that] only hard power can protect China from Western threats, liberal democracy as an existential threat and the US-led international order as illegitimate and unjust”.

 

The book argues that even with the similarities between the two leaders, there has been a “… systemic reversal of Deng’s foreign and domestic policies …. and Xi’s regime represents a fundamental break with Deng’s regime”. Pei explains this in detail using data and analysing various policy changes that Xi has adopted since 2012. He writes that “… the new political order under Xi’s rule rests on different pillars: centralised one-man rule built on personality cult, rule of fear through constant purges and repression, prioritisation of regime security over economic performance, revival of orthodox ideology and political rituals, and an expansionist foreign policy reinforced by a triumphant nationalist narrative — ‘the China dream’.” Xi has not adequately defined this dream, but Pei asserts that, “despite his political ruthlessness and his success in amassing power and making himself the most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong, Xi’s policies have put his ‘China Dream’ into serious long-term jeopardy”. He also predicts that “Xi’s version of a ‘China dream’ will not be fulfilled.”

 

The author argues that Xi could dismantle Deng’s “reforms” because the latter was not totally committed to political reform and was against a third-party check on the future establishment of personality cults. Deng who strongly opposed any shift towards liberal democracy — as exemplified by his crackdown on protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 — supported capitalist economic modernisation under one-party rule because he believed that this was the only option available to prevent the demise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even for Deng, however, there was no compromising the CCP’s centrality and supremacy. Pei suggests that, “Only with the revival of totalitarian rule under Xi can we appreciate the tragic consequences of Deng Xiaoping’s steadfast resistance to political reform in the 1980s when a narrow path towards a more open and free China existed.” He argues that “economic reforms which are pursued by neo-authoritarian regime are likely to fall into the trap of a ‘partial reform equilibrium’ [and] without rule of law and accountability enforced by a civil society or a free media, economic development under autocratic rule inevitably breeds systemic corruption”.

 

Pei asserts that as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not strong leaders so meaningful resistance or challenge to Deng’s neo-authoritarianism did not surface during their tenures. Both Jiang and Hu shied away from formulating and implementing major policies necessary to address the cracks in the system, paving the way for the eventual dismantling of Deng’s neo-authoritarian ecosystem under  Xi Jinping.

 

Pei’s book uses available information and known developments and CCP policies to trace the rise and fall of the neo-authoritarianism. It demonstrates how the rise of Xi was inevitable. As Pei writes, “The contradictions between Deng’s goals of institutionalizing the CCP and his aversion to any reforms that might weaken CCP power ultimately would render his reforms partial, ineffective, and short lived”. The rise of Xi Jinping and his narrative of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” underscores this argument.

 

The book discusses in detail China’s domestic and external challenges resulting from its abandonment of Deng’s dictum to “hide your strength and bide your time,” and shows how this has led to a New Cold War (NCW) with the United States.  The primary difference between Deng and Xi, Pei writes, is that “Deng had a more realistic and astute assessment of Chinese power and a better understanding of the cost of his policies. In contrast, Xi has demonstrated a tendency to overestimate Chinese power and to underestimate the cost of his policies”. Pei also analyses how the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War forced the Chinese leadership  to adapt and reinterpret its foreign policy.

 

The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism  succinctly captures the challenges Chinese politics and economy inherited from Deng’s reforms and how seeds of its demise were inherent in them. The books engages with a tough topic but manages to convey its primary argument with both nuance and simplicity. It is a must-read for anyone attempting to understand the path that China traversed and the essence of the Chinese domestic and foreign politics since the introduction of reform under Deng Xiaoping and how this very policy helped Xi become “leader for life”.

   

The reviewer is associate professor, O P Jindal Global University