'India paused Op Sindoor after achieving goals, escalation dominance'

Lt Gen Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), key to the 2016 surgical strike, explains how Operation Sindoor changed warfare in South Asia, why India paused, and what became of Pakistan's nuclear blackmail

In response to the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack, India launched Operation Sindoor with precision strikes on terror infrastructure inside Pakistan on May 7. Pakistan then targeted civilian and military sites in India over more than three days, drawing retaliatory strikes on 13 Pakistani military installations. On May 10 afternoon, Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations called his Indian counterpart, after which both sides agreed to stop all military action from 5:00 PM IST. With Operation Sindoor only suspended, Lieutenant General Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), the former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army’s Northern Command who held the position during the September 2016 surgical strike in retaliation to the Pakistan-backed Uri terrorist attack, speaks to Bhaswar Kumar on India’s strategic messaging and the changing character of its conflict with Pakistan. Edited excerpts:

 

Q1. How would you assess India's management of the escalation ladder during Operation Sindoor?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: As two adversaries climb the escalation ladder, they strive to achieve escalation domination in each stage. There were three broad phases of Operation Sindoor. The first phase was the Indian strike on the night of May 6-7 targeting nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. All these targets were successfully hit. The second phase began with Pakistan retaliating with drone and missile strikes. These were again successfully countered by India's air defence network and caused minimal damage. The third phase was the Indian precision strikes on Pakistan's air force infrastructure, including airfields, air defence units, and control networks. This was a devastating blow and resulted in Pakistan appealing for a ceasefire. I would, therefore, assess that India managed to achieve escalation domination at every stage of the operation.

 

Q2. Countries have responded to terror attacks with long-drawn-out wars causing significant civilian casualties. There has been a perception in the West that the War on Terror was ultimately wasteful and disproportionate. How do you view India's response to Pahalgam in that context?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: The West's War on Terror was mainly against non-state actors and did not have clear political objectives. That is why it turned into a very long war with no specific end in sight. Operation Sindoor had clearly defined objectives – to target terrorist leaders in Pakistan to send a decisive signal that terrorism would face a strong conventional military response. At the same time, India signalled that the onus of escalation was on Pakistan by describing the initial strike as "focused, measured, and non-escalatory". India's clear strategic messaging was also one reason that the crisis was quickly resolved.

 

Q3. Was Operation Sindoor — from striking terror camps to Pakistan's military sites — still below the nuclear threshold, or has it set a new bar?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: For some time now, India has been saying that Pakistan's nuclear blackmail has run its course and that waving the nuclear card in an India-Pakistan crisis will not deter New Delhi from exercising its right to the use of military force if attacked by terrorists backed by Pakistan. Operation Sindoor has certainly set a new benchmark, but I also think that fears of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia are overblown. Pakistan may appear irrational, but it is also not so self-destructive that it would leave the country in ruins.

 

Q4. Operation Sindoor has only been suspended, with the government calling it a new doctrine — one where terror backers will also be targeted, undeterred by nuclear blackmail. How would you explain what's changed from before?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: This signifies a new paradigm in India's strategic thinking of how to deal with Pakistan. There is now no low-cost option with Rawalpindi to continue using proxies to target India while shielding its military force. The backers of terrorism are clearly the Pakistan Army's leadership, and they will have to weigh the cost of a direct engagement with the Indian military if they persist with using terrorism as an instrument of state policy against India.

 

Q5. Why do you think India agreed to Pakistan's request to halt military activity, and how do you see the timing of the pause in the operation?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: The devastating Indian Air Force strikes on the night of May 9-10 exposed Pakistan's vulnerabilities. If these had continued, it would have further degraded Pakistan's ability to continue with air operations. And it was in the air that all the action was going on. This was a major reason for Pakistan appealing for a ceasefire. India had maintained escalation dominance and achieved its objectives; therefore, it had no reason to continue military operations. 

 

Q6. How has warfare in the subcontinent changed after Operation Sindoor, given that this was the first time since 1971 India targeted military installations in Pakistan-proper and the Pakistan military targeted Indian cities across both the Line of Control and the International Border?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: Purists of military language would say that the nature of war is constant, but the character of war keeps changing. The character of conflict with Pakistan is also evolving. India's last war with Pakistan in Kargil was a test of human endurance and involved close-quarter battles fought in high-altitude terrain. Operation Sindoor has been a battle fought from afar using drones, stand-off precision weapons, and long-range missiles. In such a conflict, the civilian population will not be insulated from the fighting. We have also seen a furious information battle playing out with fake news and disinformation being weaponised to create alternative realities. This will be a feature of any future conflict.

 

Q7. What lessons does this shift in the conflict's 'character' offer for defence planning, acquisition, and budgeting?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: We need to think hard about the type of weapon systems required for future warfighting. Drones have become central to combat, and we must find the right mix of manned-unmanned platforms. Technology is changing rapidly, and our acquisition systems have to become more agile to keep pace. On the budget, most experts agree that if we are to maintain a credible military force against our two main adversaries, military spending must be increased.

 

Q8. What are the doctrinal changes needed, if any?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: Historically, the Indian military has followed a reactive, defensive-oriented strategy, shaped by wars with Pakistan and China. However, the changing character of warfare—including cyber, space, information, and artificial intelligence-driven conflicts—demands a proactive, deterrence-based doctrine. We must plan for the whole spectrum of operations, from dealing with minor border clashes, to limited conflicts, to full-scale war. At the same time, we must be able to counter Grey Zone warfare, which remains below the threshold of conventional conflict.

 

Q9. What has Operation Sindoor achieved?

 

Lt Gen Hooda: Apart from the immediate destruction of terror infrastructure in Pakistan, Operation Sindoor's main achievement has been a redefinition of India's counterterrorism approach. With a military-led strategy to counter terrorism emanating from Pakistan, India has clearly signalled that it would respond decisively to future terrorist threats. The onus is now on Pakistan to rein in terrorism or face military strikes from India.