RAN Samwad: With Rajnath's call, the indian way of war takes shape

In its place appears to be a posture of punitive deterrence: A move from restraint-based reactivity to imposing costs and deterring future provocations

“It would not be wrong to say that the age we live in has just one doctrine — that there is none. Circumstances and challenges are changing with such speed that every nation is compelled to keep its strategy flexible and responsive.” In his plenary address last week, delivered at a first-of-its-kind tri-service seminar on war, warfare, and warfighting, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh offered the clearest distillation yet of the shifting nature of the battlefield — a landscape of uncertainty that India’s armed forces continue to adapt to.

 

Addressing serving officers, veterans, and experts at the RAN Samwad seminar last Wednesday at the Army War College in Mhow (Dr Ambedkar Nagar), Rajnath’s remarks on the event’s second and final day served as both a warning to adversaries and a reiteration of India’s evolving military posture: “Our endeavour must be to define the battlefield and the rules of the game ourselves, compelling the adversary to fight there (on our terms)…”. Citing Operation Sindoor as an example, he added, “The bravery and swiftness with which our forces carried out the action against terrorist shelters in Pakistan was something those terrorists could never have imagined.“

 

The answer to the uncertainty outlined by the Defence Minister appears to lie in preparing for an Indian way of warfighting — a theme that ran through the seminar. Presentations and deliberations went beyond its overarching focus on technologies shaping warfare, extending to force generation — training, equipping, and preparing units — and force application — deployment, operational structures, and execution of objectives — amid what Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan calls the third revolution in military affairs: rapid advances in space-based, cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomous capabilities.

 

Speaking on the seminar’s sidelines, a defence source underscored that the Army, Indian Air Force (IAF), and Navy’s push to become a more agile, connected force prepared for future scenarios drew lessons from recent wars — in Europe and West Asia — but remained rooted in Indian conditions. “We face the entire continuum of modern conflict — kinetic, non-contact, like the deployment of long-range standoff munitions during the May 7–10 Operation Sindoor; contact, non-kinetic, like the June 2020 Galwan clash involving melee weapons; contact and kinetic, like another Kargil War; and non-contact, non-kinetic, like cyber and information warfare. And all of this unfolds under a nuclear overhang, making escalation control critical.”

 

Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal A P Singh, in a fireside chat on day one, underscored what sets India’s approach to conflict apart by highlighting that “conflict termination” remains underemphasised globally.

 

Speaking about the recent Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference in the United Kingdom, the IAF chief noted that discussions were dominated by the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Iran and Israel–Hamas wars. “Not even a word about Sindoor in the entire conference… They were avoiding the topic,” he said. Nonetheless, he emphasised the importance of learning conflict termination at that event.

 

The IAF chief observed that the actors involved in the protracted wars in West Asia and Europe seemed to have lost sight of their original objectives. “The first thing we learn is the selection and maintenance of aim. That part has totally been forgotten,” he said.

 

Underlining that Operation Sindoor exemplified conflict termination, the IAF chief said India’s objectives were clear — to teach the terrorists a lesson by striking selected targets in Pakistan on May 7 — and once these were achieved, India stopped at the first opportunity when the other side came forward to talk. “That night, we were on a song. We could have continued to strike, but that was not our aim. Our objective was already achieved.” He was referring to the IAF’s strikes on 11 Pakistani airbases during the night of May 9–10. On the afternoon of May 10, Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations called his Indian counterpart, after which both sides agreed to cease all military action from 5:00 PM IST.

 

The IAF chief also emphasised the importance of the military conveying to the political leadership that the objectives had been achieved and the adversary had been compelled to seek talks — and of the political side being willing to heed such input.

 

Another defence source pointed out that the only other major military action in recent times to exhibit clear thinking on conflict termination was the June 2025 American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. “Given the limited target set of the Balakot air strike, Operation Sindoor marked India’s first major non-contact, kinetic conflict. A clear view on conflict termination and deliberate control of the escalation ladder enabled the achievement of politico-military objectives while minimising our economic and human costs.” However, he cautioned against interpreting this to mean that India only foresees or is preparing for limited, or short and intense, wars in the future.

 

Emphasising the need to continuously strengthen the domestic defence industry, the defence minister also said India must be prepared for conflicts of any duration. “If any war stretches for 2 months, 4 months, a year, 2 years, even 5 years, then we should be fully prepared. We must ensure that our surge capacity (ability to quickly ramp up defence production during war or crisis) is sufficient.”

 

Another key takeaway from the seminar was that the posture of “strategic restraint” — the long-standing hesitation to use force as an instrument of foreign policy — has been phased out, at least in the context of Pakistan. This shift began with the September 2016 surgical strikes, gathered pace with the February 2019 Balakot airstrike, and culminated in the new national security doctrine ushered in by Operation Sindoor — under which any future terrorist attack will be treated as an act of war. In its place appears to be a posture of punitive deterrence: a move from restraint-based reactivity to one that seeks to impose costs and deter future provocations.

 

While such a shift in posture was not articulated for the northern borders, when a dissonance emerged over the pending reorganisation of the armed forces by creating theatre commands — with one school of thought holding that the level of jointness displayed during Operation Sindoor obviates the need for disruptive restructuring, at least for now — the counter came in the context of credible deterrence on the northern front. One defence source underscored that lessons drawn from the four-day conflict with Pakistan did not necessarily carry over to meeting the challenges on the northern borders. “We don’t need theatre commands for Pakistan, but they will be necessary for any future conflict on the northern borders.” In 2016, China reorganised its seven military regions into five theatre commands.  Part of a broader push to transform the armed forces, the inaugural seminar was only the beginning. At the close of the event, the CDS said that the next annual RAN Samwad seminar—centred on multi-domain operations—is tentatively scheduled for May 2026 in Agra, with broader participation expected, especially from mid-level officers. These seminars are expected to help nurture the “scholar-warriors” India needs in the hundreds—a term and requirement the CDS has previously underscored.