Population debate needs nuance, not panic over India's fertility shift

India's falling fertility calls for region-specific, rights-based policies-not a shift from population-control fears to pro-birth alarmism

India’s fertility debate has entered a strange new phase. For decades, the public was anxious that India had “too many people” — some still seem to believe that. But today, as fertility declines across most states, a new anxiety is taking shape: That India may soon have “too few children”. Some commentators have even begun calling for a new slogan: From “Hum Do Hamare Do” to “Hum Do Hamare Teen”. Fertility is declining, and so, it seems, is nuance in public discourse.

 

The shift shows a lack of understanding of India’s demographic landscape. We are undergoing a major demographic transition, but not a uniform national fertility crisis. The challenge is not fertility decline, but whether India can respond to this transition with evidence, regional sensitivity and a commitment to reproductive choice.

 

The national total fertility rate (TFR) had already reached replacement level five years ago. The fifth round of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019-21) placed India’s TFR at 2.0, below the replacement level of 2.1. NFHS-6, released this month, also indicates that fertility remains around 2.0 nationally. But national averages conceal more than they reveal.

 

India’s demographic story, in fact, encompasses several stories. Bihar has a TFR of 2.7. Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Meghalaya and Lakshadweep are at 2.2. Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan are at 2.1. At the other end, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands record a TFR of 0.9 and Sikkim 1.0. Several states and Union Territories, including Tamil Nadu, Odisha, West Bengal, Delhi, Punjab, Goa, Assam and Mizoram, are between 1.6 and 1.7. The rural-urban difference is equally significant: India’s rural TFR is 2.1, compared to an urban TFR of 1.6.

 

This divergence matters because demographic policy cannot be designed for an imaginary average India. The policy needs of Bihar and Kerala, for instance, are wildly different. A tribal adolescent girl in rural Jharkhand and an urban working woman in Bengaluru face very different constraints around education, marriage, work, contraception, childcare and reproductive healthcare.

 

Nationally, we’re not facing sudden population collapse. The numbers suggest stabilisation across the next few decades, concurrent with ageing and regional divergence. Population Foundation of India’s projections, developed in collaboration with the International Institute of Migration and Development, show that India’s population is expected to grow from about 1.36 billion in 2021 to 1.59 billion in 2051, even as fertility declines from 2.0 to around 1.67. Annual births are projected to fall from 23 million to 17.1 million. The median age is expected to rise from 29 to around 40, and the share of elderly persons is projected to increase from 9.6 per cent to 20.4 per cent by 2051.

 

Any policy prescription here should start with not repeating old mistakes. India must not move from population-control alarmism to population-decline alarmism. Both approaches reduce people, especially women, to instruments of demographic policy. For too long, women were told to have fewer children for the sake of national development. Now, in some parts of the world and increasingly in India’s public debate, women are being told they must have more children for the sake of the nation’s demographic future. Both positions are wrong.

 

Pushing fertility up or down should never be a goal for the government. Instead, we need to build a policy environment that enables people to realise their reproductive aspirations freely, safely and with dignity.

 

The data also shows why fertility cannot be discussed in isolation. NFHS-6 shows that 20.1 per cent of women aged 20-24 were married before 18. In West Bengal, Bihar and Tripura, the figure is above one in three. Adolescent pregnancy remains almost unchanged nationally at 6.7 per cent, and is far higher in states such as Tripura, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar. These statistics hide stories of gender injustice, weak adolescent health systems, and poor investments in girls’ education and agency.

 

Family planning data also demands caution and serious consideration. Total contraceptive prevalence among married women has risen to 69.1 per cent, but modern method use has declined from 56.4 per cent to 52.7 per cent. Traditional method use has risen from 10.3 per cent to 16.4 per cent. Unmet need for family planning remains 8.5 per cent nationally, but rises to 21 per cent in Meghalaya, 14.4 per cent in Bihar, 12.6 per cent in Jharkhand and 10.8 per cent in Uttar Pradesh. Male sterilisation remains only 0.5 per cent nationally, showing that the burden of contraception continues to fall overwhelmingly on women.

 

This is why high-fertility regions, which still have large young populations, need voluntary, rights-based investments in girls’ education, adolescent health, child marriage prevention, nutrition, contraception access and quality reproductive healthcare. Fertility falls naturally when girls stay in school, women are healthier, child survival improves, and couples can access information and services. These measures have nothing to do with “population control”, but they are essential to reaping our demographic and gender dividend.

 

Low-fertility and ageing regions need a different set of investments. States such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and others must prepare for ageing, smaller families, rising care needs and a changing labour force. They need childcare, women’s workforce support, infertility prevention and treatment, geriatric healthcare, pensions, home-based care, caregiver training and social protection.

 

International experience offers an important warning. Countries such as South Korea, Japan, Singapore and China have introduced baby bonuses, tax incentives and cash transfers, yet fertility rates have remained stubbornly low. The Andhra Pradesh government, which recently announced financial incentives for having additional children, has clearly not learned from global experience. A one-time payment cannot influence a decision that is shaped by structural issues such as housing, job security, childcare, workplace culture, gender norms, parental leave, infertility care and the distribution of unpaid care work.

 

Governments must understand that you cannot ask women to have more children while making care entirely their responsibility. If women are expected to bear the physical, emotional and economic burden of childrearing almost alone, fertility decisions will inevitably be affected.

 

India’s demographic transition can become an opportunity if we plan well. The country still has a large working-age population, but the window to fully realise the demographic dividend is narrowing. To make the most of it, India must invest in young people’s education, skills, health and employment. To realise the gender dividend, it must expand women’s agency, safety and workforce participation. And to prepare for the “silver dividend”, it must build systems for healthy and dignified ageing.

 

India should keep calm and invest in its people. Population stabilisation is not a crisis. Declining fertility is not a moral failure. Ageing is not a disaster. But failure to prepare for these changes would be a serious policy failure.

Muttreja is executive director, Population Foundation of India, and Kaushik is head, strategic communications and media. The views expressed are personal