After a long hiatus, India has begun to engage with trade pacts. To what extent are these deals weighed on economic considerations and how much are they more like strategic alliances?
In 2022, India has concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with UAE, a more limited Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement with Australia. That is not the end of ambition. A Free Trade Agreement is due to be signed with Israel in June and before the financial year is over, and at least one more trade agreement shall come up with possibly the UK.
“These are strategic, no doubt about that,” said former commerce secretary, Rajeev Kher. It is a thought closely aligned with that of Robert Zoellick, former US Trade Representative and World Bank President, who famously argued that a US-Australia free trade agreement (signed in 2002) would “strengthen the foundation of our security alliance”.
The biggest demonstration of their nature is India having lowered its protection bar to allow companies from UAE to bid for government contracts. It is a demonstration of cooperation to draw investments inwards at a massive scale. “Remember, for various reasons, India cannot sign a trade deal with the US. For those companies, UAE has become the springboard to tap into India’s infrastructure opportunities,” an official in the commerce ministry said.
No trade deals were signed by India after the Narendra Modi-led government came to power in 2014, till the general elections of 2019. Soon after the government won the popular mandate once again, India spectacularly refused to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to create the largest trade group in the world, comprised of 16 nations. India withdrew just hours before the agreement, in November 2019. External affairs minister S Jaishankar put it bluntly last year: “You can’t have a tense high friction border and have great relations in all other parts of life, it doesn’t work like that.” Trade, in other words, has to follow the flag.
There were concerns, in any case, with how the earlier trade pacts had impacted India. An oft-quoted assessment by the government in 2019, showed cumulative growth in trade with partners over the last five financial years was just above a modest seven per cent. While both exports and imports grew with these "FTA partners”, the utilisation rate has been “moderate” across sectors.
It is this context which makes a study of the current trade deals useful. While the commerce ministry under Piyush Goyal shall expect the utilisation rate of the current round of trade deals to be higher, the choice of partners shows a close fit with India's strategic interests. The connection has not escaped most observers.
In 2022, India has concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with UAE, a more limited Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement with Australia. That is not the end of ambition. A Free Trade Agreement is due to be signed with Israel in June and before the financial year is over, and at least one more trade agreement shall come up with possibly the UK.
“These are strategic, no doubt about that,” said former commerce secretary, Rajeev Kher. It is a thought closely aligned with that of Robert Zoellick, former US Trade Representative and World Bank President, who famously argued that a US-Australia free trade agreement (signed in 2002) would “strengthen the foundation of our security alliance”.
The biggest demonstration of their nature is India having lowered its protection bar to allow companies from UAE to bid for government contracts. It is a demonstration of cooperation to draw investments inwards at a massive scale. “Remember, for various reasons, India cannot sign a trade deal with the US. For those companies, UAE has become the springboard to tap into India’s infrastructure opportunities,” an official in the commerce ministry said.
No trade deals were signed by India after the Narendra Modi-led government came to power in 2014, till the general elections of 2019. Soon after the government won the popular mandate once again, India spectacularly refused to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to create the largest trade group in the world, comprised of 16 nations. India withdrew just hours before the agreement, in November 2019. External affairs minister S Jaishankar put it bluntly last year: “You can’t have a tense high friction border and have great relations in all other parts of life, it doesn’t work like that.” Trade, in other words, has to follow the flag.
There were concerns, in any case, with how the earlier trade pacts had impacted India. An oft-quoted assessment by the government in 2019, showed cumulative growth in trade with partners over the last five financial years was just above a modest seven per cent. While both exports and imports grew with these "FTA partners”, the utilisation rate has been “moderate” across sectors.
It is this context which makes a study of the current trade deals useful. While the commerce ministry under Piyush Goyal shall expect the utilisation rate of the current round of trade deals to be higher, the choice of partners shows a close fit with India's strategic interests. The connection has not escaped most observers.

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