India’s health scene is marked by a highly inadequate public healthcare system and, what usually goes with such a situation, patients having to spend huge amounts of their own money. So when a new national health policy is announced (National Health Policy 2017), it is eagerly scanned to see if it has been able to put its finger on the pulse — list what needs doing for things to work where they must.
But hope is tempered by the fact that health is a state subject and most of official spending, low by normative standards, is done by state governments. Simultaneously, the country is marked by huge differences in both the quality of healthcare and human development attainments between states. Additionally, the goals set by the 2002 policy were not achieved and have in good part been adopted by the 2017 policy along with a setback in target dates.
Hence the impact of a new national health policy is best judged by posing two questions. One, where did the 2002 policy go wrong? Two, is there anything in the new policy which is targeted at bringing up the laggard states? Since in 2002 also the National Democratic Alliance was in power as it is now and in between there were 10 years of Congress rule, it may be useful to look for deeply entrenched realities to which politicians, across the board, do not have ready answers.
The 2002 policy is a remarkably honest document that finds the then existing structure far from satisfactory. If rural public healthcare services are inadequate, they are non-existent in unrecognised urban slums where migrants from rural areas usually turn up.
It said there was a need to train nurses (have more and better nurses and nurse practitioners) and paramedics to fill the skills gap and guidelines were needed for training and performance of paramedics. Also, there was a great need for doctors with specialisation in public health and family medicine. To take care of the rise in private healthcare, there was a need for regulation to ensure adequate standards.
But hope is tempered by the fact that health is a state subject and most of official spending, low by normative standards, is done by state governments. Simultaneously, the country is marked by huge differences in both the quality of healthcare and human development attainments between states. Additionally, the goals set by the 2002 policy were not achieved and have in good part been adopted by the 2017 policy along with a setback in target dates.
Hence the impact of a new national health policy is best judged by posing two questions. One, where did the 2002 policy go wrong? Two, is there anything in the new policy which is targeted at bringing up the laggard states? Since in 2002 also the National Democratic Alliance was in power as it is now and in between there were 10 years of Congress rule, it may be useful to look for deeply entrenched realities to which politicians, across the board, do not have ready answers.
The 2002 policy is a remarkably honest document that finds the then existing structure far from satisfactory. If rural public healthcare services are inadequate, they are non-existent in unrecognised urban slums where migrants from rural areas usually turn up.
It said there was a need to train nurses (have more and better nurses and nurse practitioners) and paramedics to fill the skills gap and guidelines were needed for training and performance of paramedics. Also, there was a great need for doctors with specialisation in public health and family medicine. To take care of the rise in private healthcare, there was a need for regulation to ensure adequate standards.

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